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Abstract:
YAO, CHRISTOPHER Deference to Deference: Examining the Relationship between the Courts
and the Political Branches Through Judicial Deference and the Chevron Doctrine
ADVISOR: Bradley Hays
Judicial review of agency rulemaking sits atop a nexus between all three branches of
American government, the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary. Chevron v.
NRDC (1984), a landmark case in administrative law, and its resulting doctrine of strong judicial
deference to agencies in their interpretations of statute, are paradoxical in their creation.
Although Chevron was decided at the height of Reagan-era deregulation, it greatly enhanced the
power of administrative agencies, allowing them to reinterpret the meaning of their statutory
directives as needed to justify changes to regulations with less scrutiny from the courts. It is only
in recent years that Chevron has attracted national attention, as members of Congress have
proposed legislation to force the courts to eliminate judicial deference. More than thirty years
after the Chevron decision, there is a political push against judicial deference that threatens its
very existence. This research explores the creation and development of the Chevron doctrine and
judicial deference as a whole through the lens of regime theory, focusing on the interaction
between the Judiciary and the larger political environment. Congress often reacts to trends within
the Judiciary, especially in areas that involve all three branches of government. How effectively
Congress does or does not respond to these trends is influenced by the political narrative
surrounding the issue. This research concludes that political coalitions that had previously been
divided on an issue can be united and motivated by shaping and focusing on a constitutional
narrative of the issue.
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Chapter 1: Theories of Judicial Decision Making

On July 30, 1981, then-president Ronald Reagan, speaking before a gathering of
Georgian Republican luminaries only five months after assuming office, warned that “unless
bureaucracy is constantly resisted, it breaks down representative government and overwhelms
democracy…they set up the pretense of having autonomy over everybody and being responsible
to nobody.”1 The start of the Reagan Administration in 1981 promised to be a time where
conservatives dominated a variety of government institutions and sought to reduce the regulatory
responsibilities of the federal government. Fast-forward to 1983 and it is ironic then, that the
Reagan Administration’s own push against Carter era regulations actually resulted in one of the
most significant entrenchments of bureaucratic autonomy in the form of Chevron v. NRDC
(1983).2 Through this decision, administrative agencies were granted a strong level of deference
in their interpretation of their statutory directives. Although it allowed the Reagan-era
Environmental Protection Agency to narrow certain regulations, it ultimately gave agencies in
the future a more expansive use of their powers. This legal doctrine, decided during the
ascendency of anti-bureaucracy conservatism, codified judicial deference to agencies and still
continues to persist over thirty years later and is still one of the most cited cases in the field of
administrative law.
This controversial case, which grants a strong deference to agencies when determining
the statutory scope of their mandates, has survived almost thirty years of criticism by both the
left and right as well as several changes to its application. As the vignette above illustrates, the
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Chevron doctrine was created during time of intense suspicion of agencies, cementing the
interpretive power of agencies into law. Despite this, it is only recently that the doctrine has been
criticized as unsound on constitutional grounds.3 Although there is no doubt that the overall
scope of Chevron has been narrowed in some ways over the years,4 its scope has also been
enlarged in other areas. There has been no clear, sustained retreat from Chevron and its progeny
on the part of the judiciary, but there has been a renewed political scrutiny of judicial deference
by the political branches.
Chevron’s unique location, on a nexus of all three branches of government, makes it
important in understanding how the Supreme Court tries to navigate controversial areas that
involve pressures from many different actors. Chevron is part of a large balancing act centered
around the separation of powers, within which the Court must also try to juggle the desires of
both the executive and the legislature. The ability of agencies to engage in rule making and
promulgate regulations is limited by the scope of their statutory directives and what Congress
“intends” for the natural limits of the agency to be. Although the judiciary responsible for
divining the intent of Congress from these directives, they are often vague and undefined,
leaving considerable room for agencies to maneuver. When considering Congressional intent,
the Supreme Court must try to remain faithful in its responsibility to interpret the law in cases of
ambiguity and silence from Congress. On the other hand, it must also recognize that there are
often times when Congress remains ambiguous for one reason or another and simply chooses not
to clarify the meaning of its laws. When examining whether or not an agency’s interpretation of
its statutory directive is “reasonable,” the Court must similarly balance the expertise of agencies
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and what it sees as “good policy.” Failing to adequately juggle these competing responsibilities
could result in a disadvantageous showdown between the Supreme Court and one of the other
branches of government.
By examining Chevron and judicial deference, it becomes clear that the national political
regime which exists in the political branches can be greatly influenced by the ideas generated by
the judiciary. These ideas are key in understanding how and why strong, national coalitions are
formed around certain issues. Chevron illustrates the complex relationship that exists between
the three branches of government. Judicial deference was originally a matter of administrative
necessity, developed by the courts in order to cope with an ever increasing regulatory work load.
The judiciary does not exist alone, however, and Congress took note of the trend towards
increased deference. A strong coalition against judicial deference ultimately failed to hold
because Congress, like the courts, viewed judicial deference as an administrative policy issue.
The election of a strongly deregulatory executive in Ronald Reagan compounded these issues by
creating a compelling, conservative policy rationale for judicial deference. Thus, amid these
political fractures, Chevron and strong judicial deference was allowed to develop. The
development of the Chevron doctrine in the 21st century, however, has helped generate
constitutional concerns about judicial deference in the courts and in legal academia. By seizing
on this new constitutional criticism, judicial deference has become constitutionalized in a way
that unites an otherwise diverse coalition of opponents against the doctrine. In this way,
Congress has found a solution to indecision on a policy issue by appealing to the Constitution,
making it a more existential constitutional issue.
Models of Judicial Behavior and Decision Making

3

Analysis of why the Supreme Court makes the decisions it does has been a topic of acute
interest, leading to the development of several different lenses used to try and understand the
voting habits of justices. Theories of judicial decision making include the attitudinal model, the
strategic decision model, ruling-regime thesis, and the “supply-side” theory of legal thinking.
Justices, through the lens of the attitudinal model, decide cases based on their own sincere beliefs
about a particular case.5 The strategic model, in contrast, argues that judicial decisions do not
necessarily result from the sincere preferences of the ruling judges. They are instead the product
of sophisticated decision making in which judges vote in part based on how external actors will
react to their decision.6 The ruling-regime thesis sees judicial decisions as products of the
preference of political majorities, rather than as counter-majoritarian decisions insulated from
outside factors.7 The supply-side theory looks at judicial decisions as part of a larger legal
community, as the result of strands of legal theory developed by legal intellectual elites and
implemented in practice by judges. These legal theories, which legitimate what judges can and
cannot do, are “delivered” from the intellectual community to the judges through sophisticated
networks of public interest law firms and other legal advocacy groups.8 Finally, the historicalinterpretive approach locates judicial decisions as the result of values that have become
imbedded in the Supreme Court and, in the minds of justices and outside actors, provide
guideline by which the Court is able to determine which cases to pursue and how to rule in those
cases.
Although the attitudinal model provides some insight into the decision making of the
Courts, it does so in an overly narrow context. One of the key assumptions of this model was that
5
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judges decide based on their sincere values against the merits of the case, which is to say that the
dominating factors in any case are the facts of the case and what judges personally believe. The
issue with this assumption is that, in taking a judge-centric view, ignoring that judges operate in
a larger institutional context. In important ways, institutions like the Supreme Court are not
simply neutral platforms for enacting personal policy-preferences. Howard Gillman points to
institutional arrangements and historical contexts as a source of constrain in judicial decision
making.9 Even though justices on the bench may not be directly constrained by electoral and
legislative concerns, they are still limited by other factors.
Can the attitudinal model explain Chevron? While it stands to reason that justices would
not support an outcome that went against their most important beliefs, Mark Graber notes that
this does not mean that cases are exclusively the product of policy preferences.10 Using the
attitudinal model to describe the Chevron lineage has limited application because Chevron’s
location on a nexus of overlapping institutional concerns. Chevron is compelling because of its
resilience across time. To look only at the preferences of individual justices when examining a
chain of cases involving all three branches of government runs the risk of ignoring competing
pressures from both within the Court and without. Although it is probable in every case that the
individual preferences of the judges play a role in decision making, to confine analysis of
Chevron and its progeny to the product of which ever justices happened to be sitting on the Court
when those cases were decided ignores the continuity of the lineage. In Chevron in particular, the
case was decided unanimously by justices from across the spectrum, ranging from the more
conservative Chief Justice Burger to more liberal justices like Justice Brennan. It is unlikely that
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that such a varied range of justices would all agree on Chevron based purely on their personal
beliefs and on the merits of the case. Attitudinal considerations do not provide a satisfactory
theoretical argument for why Chevron continues to influence Courts in the face of opposition.
The strategic choice model of judicial decision making provides a more complex lens
through which to view Supreme Court cases. Federal judges, appointed by government officials
for indefinite terms, are free from the pressures of election can devote themselves to producing
“good policy outcomes”, regardless of what those outcomes may actually be. But what the judge
sees as good policy outcomes are not always the same as the outcome the judge sincerely
believes is right.11 Rather than merely using the Court to advance their own sincere values,
justices must balance their own views with pressures that originate from a broad array of
political actors, including Congress and the executive. In this model, justices may vote in
opposition to their sincere beliefs in order to create the best policy outcome. In some ways, the
judiciary in the strategic choice model is playing a “game” with other political actors. The goal
of the Court in this analysis is to decide in the best possible manner to the responses of other
actors. If voting in line with their preferences could cause produce a negative outcome, say a
conflict with another branch of government that could weaken the Court, then justices will be
more inclined to alter their voting habits in response to those factors and to produce a more
positive outcome.
While this lens provides a more nuanced view of Chevron than that of the attitudinal
model, acknowledging that justices do not decide in a vacuum separate from the rest of the
world, it still ignores fundamental administrative concerns that the Supreme Court faces as an
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institution. After all, a core aspect of an institution’s stability is simply being able to fulfill its
directives. In the courts’ case, they must, at a minimum, process the cases that come before them.
In the strategic model, decisions are made from point to point and presume that the Supreme
Court look primarily at how other institutions will react, with little emphasis on a larger pattern
of decision making. Gillman argues that “the course of action that might best maximize the
interests of the justices in the long run would be to act in a way that appeared principled rather
than strategic.”12 Purely strategic decisions may, in fact, better be seen as merely tactical
decisions. Tactics are necessary to win individual battles while strategy is necessary to achieve
larger goals. In the context of the courts, the larger strategy may be to follow certain principles in
order to maintain legitimacy or simply remain able to fulfill the basic work required. Although
decisions in the strategic choice model may produce the best outcomes at that moment, they do
not necessarily help the judiciary achieve its preferred long term goals and outcomes.
The ruling regime thesis has helped illustrate the ways in which judges, while technically
insulated from democratic accountability, still vote in line with the national, ruling political
group. The role of the Court as a policy-making institution that regularly votes in line with
national political majorities, rather than as a counter-majoritarian institution, was popularized by
Robert Dahl in his seminal work Decision-making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a
national policy-maker. Rather than acting as a policy-making institution outside the democratic
accountability inherent in other branches, Dahl argues that “the policy views dominant on the
Court are never for long out of line with the policy views dominant among the lawmaking
majorities of the United States.”13 From this view, cases are decided in line with policies
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preferred the political majority and Supreme Court decisions tend to have a strong correlation
with majority ideology. The main function of the Supreme Court, through this lens, is to
legitimate the policy decision of the political majority.14 By overlooking these important
elements, the attitudinal theory assumes a unidirectional effect, that the Supreme Court as an
institution is influenced by the current slate of justice and does not in turn influence them.
The original Chevron decision, made in 1984, itself may be a product of this sort of
regime politics, as the decision helped solidify a level of agency power that was popular with the
previous, more liberal administrations. Although the case was decided under a conservative
president and with a Republican majority senate, Reagan had only appointed one new justice to
the Supreme Court at that time. As a matter of fact, neither Reagan’s then sole appointee to the
Supreme Court, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, nor the most conservative member of the Court,
Justice William Rehnquist, participated in the decision. In the face of a rising tide of
conservative ideology, regime theory would tell us that the justices of the Supreme Court
decided Chevron in an attempt to protect the values of the previous regime. Difficulties arise,
however, when examining the Chevron lineage of cases as a whole. The Chevron doctrine has
not only managed to persist across both liberal and conservative administration in spite of
changes to justices on the bench, but has also experienced some of its most significant
expansions under the conservative Rehnquist Court.
The “supply-side” theory of judicial decision making argues that many, if not all, of the
legal thinking implemented in the Supreme Court must first be generated and legitimized by
academics. According to Steven Teles, “the increasing importance of ideas and professional
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power have led to a decline in the power of elections to cause comprehensive change… in highly
insulated policy and institutional domains, such as law…”15 In effect, the decisions made by the
Supreme Court are constrained by intellectual support for those decisions. Without the proper
intellectual and elite support structures, new legal ideas are unable to supplant more established
legal doctrines. In particular, this lens can help explain why legal ideas retain their longevity
while others are quickly phased out. Intellectual backing for certain ideas constrains the ways in
which the Court can decide a case. If there is no backing for a specific decision, the Court is
unable to legitimately rule in that was. In a sense, competing ideas must be “proven” as superior
through a strong and vibrant intellectual community. Legal ideas require a strong intellectual
backing before they can be transmitted to the courts.
This supply-side theory can help explain the course of judicial deference, particularly by
focusing on the fact that ideas matter. The course of Chevron, from its long period of acceptance
to the intense scrutiny it faces now, may be attributable in part to the direction of legal theory,
rather than solely to the preferences of the justices or political bodies. If the intellectual base for
eliminating deference to agencies does not exist, and the legal intellectual community is instead
producing ideas involving strong deference, then it becomes more difficult to criticize the
doctrine in a way that reaches across political cleavages. Ideas may generate specific legal
outcomes, but they can also be created in response to court cases. In realms where the political
and the legal overlap, the political branches of government often seek to emulate the law, taking
legal ideas and concepts and bringing them into the political realm.16 A strong intellectual
backing of ideas does not guarantee that the Supreme Court will take them up and implement
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them through decisions. This means that supply-side theory can explain why justices on the
Court had to choose from a specific set of ideas when deciding a case, but not why the justices
chose a specific idea from that larger set. So, the supply-side theory may provide a partial picture
of the why Chevron has survived, but not necessarily why it has evolved in the ways it has.
To understand Chevron and its descendants, it is important to recognize that their place in
the administrative responsibilities of the Supreme Court and as particularly influenced by the
other branches of government. When it comes to judicial deference, every branch has a stake in
the issue. Regime theory tempered with a focus on the importance of ideas in unifying the
national political regime can help explain Chevron and judicial deference as more than a series
of cases, each decided in response to conditions unique to that case. This interpretive approach
explains Chevron and, importantly, its political evolution, not as the product of the preferences
of judges nor as the result of a strategic game against the other branches of government. It is
instead the product of an institutional responsibility that necessitate establishing a judicial
deference to agencies. Indeed, it can go even further to help explain why the Chevron doctrine
has become an areas of intense criticism over thirty years after the case was first decided. The
Supreme Court retains its institutional power and strength by “maintaining [a] coherent and
defensible tradition”17 in its case law and doctrines. In recent years, it has not done so with
Chevron, creating a chaos that has given rise to new criticisms of the doctrine. Despite theories
of judicial decision making based on either wholly legal or completely ideological justifications,
the influence of institutional norms can be seen throughout a variety of Supreme Court cases and
across Courts in general, affecting how cases are decided from one-time period to the next.

17
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Although the Supreme Court is filled with appointed judges who enjoy life tenure and is
therefore not regarded as one of the political branches, a term reserved for executive and the
legislative, this distinction is misleading as to the Court’s true nature. The lack of democratic
accountability in the selection of Supreme Court justices does not insulate them from the politics
inherent in their work. Instead, judges are heavily influenced by and heavily influence the
political environment that surrounds them and their Courts. Because Chevron in particular lies at
the meeting points of all three branches of government, it is important to recognize the value of
an institutional approach in understanding the judiciary. Judicial review of agency action is
tricky on many levels, from the lack of expertise on the Court’s part to the competing pressures
from different parts of the executive and the legislative. Indeed, the Court has long been engaged
with the other branches of government and has often made its decisions with due consideration
of the surrounding environment. This responsiveness to the political environment has existed
since the earliest parts of the history of the Court. In the seminal case of Marbury v. Madison, the
Court, although sympathetic to the Federalist cause, recognized the likelihood of a constitutional
crisis were it to side with Marbury and for partly that reason, amongst others, voted to strike
down section 13 of the judiciary Act of 1789. With Marbury, the Court had made a decision that
went beyond the preferences of the justices and beyond strict legal understanding, making a
strategic vote based on its understanding of the Jefferson presidency. Foundational decisions like
Marbury instilled the nascent judiciary with certain values that later influence the decisions of
justices later in the Court’s history. Examining how a new institutional analysis of other Supreme
Court decisions has provided insights into the rationales behind those decisions can also shed
light on its use in the context of Chevron.

11

Regime theory goes beyond just looking how the Court is influenced by Congress,
instead also looking at when Congress chooses to defer to the Court’s judgement on an issue.
Elements of regime theory also explain how Congress and the courts behave when there is no
strong, national regime on a particular issue. Graber argues Congress often pushes issues that it
cannot, or does not, on to the courts to avoid the political repercussion of an actual vote.18
Congress defers to the judiciary when issues bisect parties, rather than cut between them. If an
issue bisects a political party, then resolving such an issue politically creates winners and losers
within the same party. Rather than continue debate on such bisecting issues, which is
unappealing because they create intra-party splits, In essence “Courts offer… opportunities for
pushing unwanted fights off the political agenda.”19 By appealing to the judiciary to take the lead
and substitute their judgement on a particular issue, congressional leaders can reduce the salience
of an issue, at least temporarily.
Chevron and judicial deference provide an interesting variation on this particular facet of
regime theory by highlighting how legislative deference works at the administrative agency
crossroads. Congress, which writes agencies’ statutory directive, ultimately has the final say on
“what” it intended in the law. In that way, it also has the final say on whether or not the courts
should defer to administrative agencies. Indeed, when judicial deference is presumed to be a
product of tacit Congressional delegation of power to agency, Congress merely needs to pass a
law saying that it does not tacitly delegate interpretive power to agencies and that the courts
should not presume so. Why it has not done so, despite previous attempts, is illustrative of
legislative deference.

18
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Beyond just appealing to the courts on difficult issues, Congress has also often adopted
legal language in their own debates and statutes in order to create a veneer of more “just”
policies, rather than policies with political motivations. Gordon Silverstein argues that legal
thinking, or at least attempts to emulate it by Congress, have had a significant impact on the
ways in which we think about “good” politics.20 By incorporating legal thinking into politics, or
as Silverstein says “juridifying” politics, Congress hoped to avoid the most controversial and
dividing aspect of legislations, “[shifting] policy disputes out of the murky and discredited realm
of politics.”21 Politics and policy issues are often filled with grey areas of disagreement and
compromise. In law, issues appear more clear-cut and directed towards either finding “justice” or
else clearly defined by a single document, whether that document is part of statutory law or the
Constitution itself.
Part of this trend is also the “constitutionalization” of issues by conservatives. Ken
Kersch argues that conservatives have been able to unify otherwise diverse and fractious political
coalitions on certain issues by appealing to the Constitution.22 Constitutionalizing an issue and
appealing to more fundamental law helps remove the issue from policy and politics. If politics is
messy, constitutionalizing an issue constrain debate in a very real way. Whether or not an issue is
constitutional is not a matter of whether or not that issue is politically acceptable or good policy.
Instead, the debate becomes a battle over the fundamental acceptability of the issue. This
constitutional-talk has a profound effect on the acceptability of issues. Kersch notes that “the
history of American constitutional development provides many instances in which coherent
constitutional theories work successfully to overcome potential veto points and countervailing
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centers of power.”23 Ideas have power and how they are developed and delivered to the national
dialogue is important in understanding why the framing of debates change. Judicial deference is
one such issue that has been constitutionalized in recent years and understanding how this new
constitutional frame has motivated renewed discussion of Chevron sheds light on how
constitutional-talk is important in modern politics.
A regime theory analysis of Chevron and judicial deference, focusing on trying to
establish a coherent narrative for the creation and criticism of the Chevron doctrine, requires an
in-depth analysis of primary documents. Primary documents help shed light on the potential
intellectual influences that the Supreme Court takes into consideration when making its decisions
and on the surrounding political environment. For a chain of cases like the Chevron lineage, a
wide range of documents is necessary in order to fully understand the extent of possible
influences on the Court, administrative or political, requires looking at the concerns raised during
courts cases as well as the concerns raised in Congress.
Supreme Court majority opinions provide a straightforward indication of the Court’s
rationale on the specifics of a case. The Chevron doctrine changes over time in the way it does
because the Court, when applying it to particular cases, chooses in its majority opinions when to
simply apply it and when to make alterations to the doctrine, either to expand its reach or narrow
the ways in which it can be applied in that specific case and when it will be applied in future
cases. In addition to the majority opinions of the Court, concurrent and dissenting opinions
provide insight into competing lines of thought that the Court could have adopted as well as
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providing the foundations for future arguments. These separate opinions work to provide
alternative explanations for what the Court may legitimately do or not do.
Congressional hearing records and political briefs are invaluable in locating Chevron and
judicial deference in the wider political field. These documents provide firsthand accounts of
how the political branches of government viewed judicial deference and Chevron and how those
view shifted over time. Legislation proposed to affect and limit judicial deference also illustrates
how Congress has, at times, felt a need to directly intervene with the Court’s decision making
process.
Decisions and opinions from lower Courts, such as the United States Courts of appeals,
also provide insight into the intellectual strands of thought influencing Supreme Court decisions.
Lower Courts are often cited as acting as “laboratories” for developing constitutional theory,
experimenting with different legal ideas in their rulings that then “percolate” up to the Supreme
Court over time.24 Looking at lower Court decisions allows us to trace legal development that
occurs at a lower level, then rises up to the Supreme Court. Because the Chevron doctrine has
more often been invoked and used in the lower Courts than the Supreme Court,25 there is likely
to be more opportunities for development of the Chevron doctrine in lower level Courts than on
the Supreme Court. Although not all, or even most, of the lower Court developments are adopted
at the level of the Supreme Court, tracing ideas that were adopted by the Supreme Court to their
lower Court of origin would shed light on the original rationale and source of those ideas.
In addition to decisions from the Courts themselves, amicus Curiae briefs, and briefs by
the petitioners and respondents of cases, illustrate the possible intellectual basis for Supreme
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Court decisions that have been developed in the external environment. Amicus curiae briefs,
briefs submitted by third parties on behalf of one of the litigants, are particularly useful in
demonstrating the pool of intellectual resources available to the justices on the Court. Briefs
submitted by various interest groups and public interest law firms are the product of ideadevelopment and mobilization on the supply side of the legal system and provide judges with the
justifications necessary to decide cases in certain ways. Gilman argues that “the numbers, needs,
experiences, and perspective of litigants establish the context within which the justices perform
their responsibilities.”26 By examining the briefs submitted by the litigants, we can establish
some of the expectations and pressures on the Court during that particular case, as well as
contextualize the environment in which these decisions were made.
A Road Map Through Chevron
The following chapters of this thesis will examine the evolution of judicial deference and
the Chevron doctrine as an administrative tool and determine the political conflicts that have
motivated discussion around the doctrine. Chapter 2 traces the origins of judicial deference to
administrative agencies and the executive in general, beginning with the initial stages in the
1950s and continuing through the period of doctrinal standardization that occurred in the 1970s.
By starting here, this paper will locate Chevron in a wider context, as part of a larger discussion
of administrative concerns by the judiciary in an era of increasing regulation by agencies. This
chapter will also look at standards of deference used by the Court prior to the initial Chevron
decision, such as the Skidmore balancing test, in order to determine what compelled the Court to
begin its push towards stronger and more consistent forms of deference. An analysis of these
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prior legal constructs and their justifications will illuminate the factors that necessitated that the
Supreme Court move to a much stronger level as deference, as well as establish the initial
environment of Chevron at time zero. Identifying the pressures and values that led to the creation
of Chevron sets the stage for further discussion of the doctrine’s evolution.
Chapter 3 switches from the judiciary to the legislative and executive, tracking the
controversy surrounding judicial deference and the Bumpers Amendment to eliminate judicial
deference. This time period is particularly important because Bumpers occurred only a few years
prior to the Chevron decision and sparked a tense debate about judicial deference in Congress. A
close examination of this period helps resolve an important paradox in the doctrine’s creation,
reconciling a highly deregulatory political regime with the agency empowering Chevron case.
Congress and the executive were not unaware of the growing doctrine of judicial deference and
how they viewed the doctrine and reacted to it is an important part of explaining Chevron. Even
though Congress very close to eliminating judicial deference during the transition to the Reagan
Administration, it ultimately refrained from doing so. Indeed, the debate around judicial
deference became eerily quiet after the defeat of the Bumpers Amendment, reflecting an
increased willingness in Congress to defer to the Court’s own trajectory and views of deference.
Chapter 4 focuses on the various modifications to Chevron starting in the 2000s and
continuing to more recent cases, looking at the first major change to the Chevron formulation in
U.S. v. Mead and then the subsequent cases that have complicated the Chevron puzzle. This era
in Chevron’s history represents a time of great modification to the doctrine and demonstrates a
change in how the Court approaches strong deference to agencies. While U.S. v. Mead imposed a
significant limitation on when Chevron deference is applied, National Cable &
Telecommunications Association v. Brand X Internet Services greatly expanded the influence of
17

Chevron deference within its remaining domain. Again, rather than simply abandon the doctrine
and create a new one or letting Chevron remain as it was, the Court chose to, in a series of
alternating cases, expand and limit Chevron’s scope. At the same time, this tension was again
recognized by Congress. In particular, Congress adopted the constitutional language used to
criticize these changes, which have helped unify opposition to judicial deference within the
Congressional Republican Party. This chapter explores the tension created between and by these
competing standards of deference, the growing intellectual opposition to the doctrine on
constitutional grounds, and how Congress has again begun to debate the desirability of judicial
deference.
Chapter 5 concludes this paper by reflecting on the importance of framing an issue in
rallying support for or against it. By bringing judicial deference from the realm of policy to the
realm of the constitutional, Republicans have been able to frame Chevron in a way that reaches
across the policy cleavages of the policy realm. Importantly, however, it was the courts and legal
academics who played a pivotal role in generating these constitutional criticisms of Chevron. By
adopting this legal language and appealing to the Constitution, judicial deference becomes a
more black-and-white issue, free from the numerous policy concerns that had divided
conservatives in the past.
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Chapter 2: The Court’s Post-War Approach to Judicial Deference

Attempting to analyze the Supreme Court’s approach to deference in 1955, New York
University law professor Bernard Schwartz wrote that anyone who relied on the Supreme Court
for an explanation would almost most certainly declare “the more you explain it, the less I
understand it.”27 The Court’s attitude toward judicial review of administrative rule-making in the
decades pre-ceding Chevron, and thus the attitude of the lowers courts, was indeed difficult to
understand and was characterized by a haphazard, case-by-case approach that was not abandoned
until the adoption of Chevron. This disorganized approach to deference persisted for a significant
length of time without the Court creating any sort of formal reasoning for its varying, and often
conflicting, decisions.
This chapter first lays out the key components of pre-Chevron deference that prevailed in
the 1950s through the 1960s. The courts during this period attempted to wrestle with new limits
imposed on judicial review of agencies by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and with the
highly specialized nature of agency regulations. These developments occurred when the New
Deal political coalition held power, during which there was a proliferation of administrative
agencies and a general support for an increasing use of agencies to further policies. In a sense,
the prevailing political regime did not apply pressure to the Court in this arena, something that
would change as support for agencies eroded in the 1970s and 1980s This chapter then attempts
to explain the transition to “strong” Chevron style deference, beginning in the 1970s, as a result
of the incredible increases in the courts’ caseloads and which spawned a variety of problems
related to the inconsistent use of deference in the past. This time period also generated a great
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deal of academic thought on that framed it in a primarily administrative light, with focus being
directed towards the benefits of judicial deference in handling new agency-related cases.
Although the Supreme Court and the judiciary are affected by the national political
regime, they do not always move in lockstep with it. This phenomenon is important to
understanding the context for the Court’s approach to deference and ultimately its landmark
decision in Chevron. The seemingly discretionary and, perhaps, arbitrary nature of the Court’s
earliest approaches to deference demonstrate that, without the pressures of a strong political
regime the Court was apt to experiment in its decision making. Tracing the development of these
early decisions, as well as properly noting the unique characteristics of the New Deal political
regime, reveals that the Court created a legal environment that was rich in potential approaches
to deference, but ultimately did not move towards a more uniform approach until increasing
administrative pressures in the form of increased caseloads made judicial deference more
desirable.
Judicial Deference in the 1950s and 1960s
Prior to the Administrative Procedure Act of 1947, courts were left to decide on their own
how to approach administrative agency rulemaking. The Supreme Court’s earliest attempts to
elaborate on its standard of judicial deference revolved around the Skidmore balancing test,
described by Justice Jackson arguing on behalf of a unanimous Court as “the weight of
[deference to an administrative agency] in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness
evident in [an agency’s] consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier
and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power
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to control.”28 This test attempted to create a flexible test that would determine deference on a
case-by-case basis without applying any strict guidelines. While the Skidmore balancing test
elaborated a few criteria that the Court would later use in deciding deference to administrative
agencies and was the clearest explanation of the Court’s approach to deference, the Court
ultimately chose not to rely heavily on Skidmore in its future cases. Rather, it would instead
incorporate elements of the test into later deference doctrines.
Following the end of the second World War, Congress attempted to sharply mark the
boundaries of the scope of judicial review of agencies through the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA), which tasked courts to “decide all relevant question of law, interpret constitutional and
statutory provisions”29 when reviewing agency rule-making and to “set aside agency action…
found to be arbitrary [or] capricious…[.]” Both these provisions would form the basis of the
Court’s approach to deference during the latter half of the New Deal era. The goal of the APA
was to enforce a strict separation of powers on administrative agencies and to force agencies to
participate in the adversarial court system.30 There is some evidence that Congress attempted to
use the APA as a tool to limit the Court’s ability to experiment with new standards of
deference.31 Despite this goal and the language in the statute, the APA was unable to induce the
courts to create a standardized deference test in the courts. In fact, the provisions of the APA
have been interpreted to allow up to six different standards for judicial deference and as few as a
single standard.32 Depending on how the APA was read, its attempts to constrain the Court’s
approach to deference could be vastly limiting or relatively lax. The passage of the APA alone
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did not create a coherent approach towards deference and, in some cases, only served to
complicate the increasingly complex issue.
Following the passage of the APA, Congress left the field of judicial deference to the
courts, remaining relatively uninvolved for a period of several decades. This era in the Court’s
history, from the 1950s until the end of the 1960s, represented a phase of experimentation, where
the courts were free to engage in a variety of approaches to judicial deference without external
political pressure. Both the Republican Party and the Democratic Party of this time period
enunciated a continued support of administrative agencies. The 1956 Republican Platform went
so far as to commend “the regulatory agencies under this Administration [for having] moved
vigorously to end discrimination in interstate commerce.”33 During this time period, even
Republican administrations leaned heavily on administrative agencies to provide support and
overt condemnation of the administrative state was absent from Republican platforms during this
time.
As a result of this, there was a lack of regime pressure from either party on the Court to
decide cases involving deference to agencies in any particular way. The Eisenhower
Administration in particular relied heavily on administrative agencies to implement its policies
and allowed agency head relatively large amounts of discretion in their work. 34 Regime theory
predicts that the Court generally aligns with the ruling political regime. Absent a strong regime
certain policy areas, the Court is left to its own devices. Bernard Schwartz, writing in 1955,
noted that “present-day discussions of the scope of review are no longer dominated by the heat of
partisan controversy…”35 Both political parties of the time, Democrats and Republicans, ceded
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the debate of the question of judicial deference to agencies to the courts. In this vacuum
surrounding administrative agencies, the Court attempted to establish a method of deference,
with limited success, through two avenues, the fact-law distinction and the rational-basis test.
The first avenue centered on the ambiguous language within the APA regarding the
“fact” and “law” distinction. Although matters of fact can be understood as answering the
question “what happened” and matters of law answer “what should happen” there are many
questions that can best be termed as “mixed questions” that have elements of both. In theory, the
fact-law distinction in the context of administrative law would allow judges to rely on the
expertise of agencies in deciding the facts of a case, but would leave the ultimate decisions of
law to judicial discretion. By taking a literal definition of the words “fact” and “law,” the APA
attempted create clear, separate categories for the acceptability of juridical deference. Judges
using the fact-law distinction would not need to spend the time and resources necessary to
recreate the facts of the case themselves by holding evidentiary hearings. Instead, they can accept
the agency’s account of what happened and save their limited time for determining questions of
law, where they theoretically have a comparative advantage and an institutional requirement to
do so.
In practice, the fact-law distinction did almost nothing to really limit when and how the
courts deferred to agencies. Rather than force the courts to neatly divide issues of law that they
could review and issues of fact that they could not, the Court instead chose a pragmatism-based
approach the law-fact distinction. Kenneth Culp Davis notes in his extensive review on
administrative law that “judges commonly tend to use the terms [law and fact] in their analytical
sense but that at the same time judges usually tend to allocate functions between agencies and
courts on the basis of practical concerns instead of on the basis of analysis of the words ‘law’ and
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‘fact’.”36 In other words, judges often used the term “fact” to describe issues that they felt
agencies could better resolve based on their expertise while judges used the term “law” to instead
refer to areas that judges felt comfortable substituting their own judgements for that of agencies.
Rather than create a clear differentiation in reviewable actions based on matters of “fact” and
“law” the APA instead induced courts merely to change the language of their decisions. This
outcome to the fact-law distinction was anticipated prior to the passage of the APA by the report
from the Attorney General’s Committee on Administrative Procedure, which wrote that “what
one judge regards as a question of fact another thinks is a question of law.”37
This characteristic of the fact-law distinction, and its nature as a reaction to the statutes of
the APA, meant that the Court’s use of the distinction rested heavily on the elements of the
particular cases and how willing each judge was to substitute judgement for that of the agencies.
Rather than a comprehensible doctrine, the fact-law distinction was merely a reaction to the lawfact constraints the APA sought to impose, a way for the courts to avoid conflict with the law
rather than to clarify when and how agencies should be afforded deference. In addition to the
fact-law distinction, however, the Court also experimented with the “rational-basis” test
regarding deference to agencies. The rational basis test approach to judicial deference had
existed since at least the New Deal era38 and was the Court’s alternative to the difficulties of the
fact-law distinction discussed above.
By using the rational basis test, the Court side-stepped the issues of the law-fact
distinction and ignores that language in the APA entirely, instead choosing to focus on whether
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or not the agency acted in an “arbitrary or capricious manner.”39 This particular doctrine was
exemplified by Gray v. Powell, in which Justice Jackson concluded that the courts have fulfilled
their role in reviewing the rulemaking of agencies if they find that the agency acted in a “just and
reasoned manner.”40 In practice, this mean that if the reviewing court feels that there are several
possible, competing interpretations of a statute, it will defer to the agency’s interpretation as long
as that interpretation is reasonable. This doctrine, which reflected elements of Skidmore’s
“validity of reasoning” criterion, was used in a large number of cases to justify deference to
agencies. Although the use of this test avoided classifying an issue as law or fact, it was used in a
highly inconsistent manner by the Court, which chose to apply it in a seemingly arbitrary manner
without justification.41 In cases that were substantially similar, the Court often chose to use the
rational basis for one case and not the other, with no explanation for the lack consistency.
Indeed, the only substantial difference between cases was often whether or not the Court agreed
with the agency.42 Rather than use Gray v. Powell as an opportunity to clearly demonstrate its
approach to deference, the Court’s decision in that case was limited and the application of this
doctrine was left up to judicial discretion, leading to similar cases with different outcomes and no
mention of whether or not the agency had a “rational basis” for its interpretation.43
The Court’s experimentation with the rational basis test during this time resulted in two
separate lines of case law. One line argued that courts should use the rational basis test in order
to determine when to give proper deference to agencies. The other line suggests that it is entirely
up to the discretion of the courts when to substitute their judgement for that of the agencies. The
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division between these two case lines essentially meant that there was no prevailing formula for
lower courts to look to for guidance when determining deference. Davis argues that “[…] we
have two lines of cases, not a single line of cases, and […] we have no authoritative judicial
explanation of what motivates the Supreme Court in choosing between the two lines in deciding
any particular case.”44 Although the Supreme Court had succeeded in creating a variety of tools
to deal with deference to administrative agencies under the APA, the courts were unwilling to
uniformly apply judicial deference in a coherent manner for several decades
Strikingly, this unclear and ambiguous approach to deference continued throughout the
1960s with little or no change. Revisiting his 1958 treatise in 1970, Professor Davis writes that
“no development during the twelve-year period calls for even the slightest change in analysis in
Chapter 30 [of the 1958 treatise].”45 The rational-basis test continued to be used inconsistently,
in an on46 and off47 manner, for the duration of this period and the fact-law distinction continued
to be as indistinct as before. Judicial deference was a matter of pure discretion by the judiciary.
The Court’s static approach to deference may, at least in part, be the result of the continued lack
of pressure from the political regime. For almost the entirety of the 1960s, the Democratic Party
controlled both houses of Congress and the Presidency. Without external political pressure, the
Court was free to decide each individual cases based on other factors, including attitudinal and
strategic influences. In this regard, it is not necessary to explore why the Court decided
individual cases the way it did. Instead, it is important to note that the Court chose to decide
these cases without implementing a standard test to create some uniformity in its decision
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making. This period of stability, if not clarity, in the Court’s approach to deference continued
through the end of the New Deal era.
Political and Administrative Changes in the 1970s and Their Effects on Judicial Deference
If taken in isolation, the Court’s long period of complacency in the 1950s and 1960s
makes its decisions in the 1970s and 1980s and, ultimately, Chevron difficult to explain.
Although Professor Davis accurately observes that the Court’s own approach to agencies was
unchanged during this time, it is just as important, if not more so, to look at the broader
influences that were developing. During the period of time that Professor Davis saw no change in
the Court’s doctrine of deference, or lack thereof, the surrounding political environment beyond
the Court was undergoing shift in its view towards administrative agencies, particularly within
the Republican Party. Concurrently, the administrative concerns facing the judiciary regarding
regulatory caseloads were also increasing dramatically. If the Court’s legal view of judicial
deference to agencies was relatively stagnant during the 1960s, the Republican Party’s was
undergoing a seismic shift that would come to form a major plank of the Republican platform for
decades to come.
Where the Eisenhower era Republican Party of the 1950s had relied as heavily on
agencies as the Democratic Party, the Republican Party of the 1960s had grown more suspicious
and hostile towards agency regulation. 1968 Republican Party platform warned of “an
entrenched, burgeoning bureaucracy [that] has increasingly usurped powers” and called for a
“strict Congressional oversight of administrative and regulatory agency compliance with the
letter and spirit of the law… [.]”48 Although the Court was isolated in the shifts in the Republican
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Party platform due to the Democratic dominance of Congress and the presidency, the politics of
the era were changing in a way that would soon force the Court to confront the issue of judicial
deference to agencies directly. With the election of a Republican president in the 1968, the field
of judicial deference to agencies, previously the sole domain of the courts, would become
increasingly crowded by other political forces.
Just as importantly, the judiciary during this period of time also began to face serious
administrative issues that arose from the increased pace of regulation. These administrative
concerns came in two main forms. First, the sheer volume and complexity of agency cases
increased dramatically over the 1970s. The judiciary as an institution has a basic responsibility to
process cases and resolve them as quickly as possible. Like everything else, however, the
judiciary is subject to time and resource constrains which limit its ability to function. These
administrative constraints began rapidly expand during the 1970s. From 1970 to 1978, the
number of cases filed with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit increased by almost
100 percent, with the number of judges on the bunch remaining constant.49 By 1981, almost 15
percent of all cases filed with the courts of appeal were agency cases, with over half of those
cases being concentrated in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.50 These
massive increases to caseloads aggravated the administrative concerns about how the courts
should handle the increase in case volume. On top of those concerns, Judge Patricia Wald,
writing during that time period, notes that “a greater portion of [agency cases] present [complex
and technical matters] now than they did 30 years ago…”51 Judges are not specialists and the
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ever increasing complexity of regulations requires that judges continue to defer to agencies on
more than just issues of fact, if only because agencies apply their statutory directives every day.
The second administrative issue that developed at this time was one partially of the
Court’s own making. The Supreme Court provides guidance to the lower courts in its
judgements, helping to create a predictable and standardizes judicial process throughout the
federal court system. In the period before Chevron, as discussed above, this was clearly not the
case. During the 1970s, Levin notes that “opposing interest groups seeking review of rulemaking
proceedings often engage[d] in a frantic ‘race to the courthouse,’ each striving to secure a forum
it considers favorable.”52 Because of the Supreme Court’s haphazard approach to judicial
deference in the past, there was an uneven and highly discretional application of judicial
deference in the lower courts. Some courts relied more on the judicial deference line of cases
when deciding agency cases while other relied more on the judicial judgement substitution line
of cases. Opponents of agency action would often “forum shop” and bring their case before
courts that seemed more sympathetic and less likely to defer to agency interpretations. This
“forum shopping” was an issue of increasing concern in the judiciary and the wider legal
intellectual environment at the time.53 Without a consistent, national standard for judicial review,
“forum shopping” in the courts became an increasingly serious concern.
These outside administrative pressures helped catalyze the Court’s approach to judicial
deference in two important ways. First, the Court, forced to confront the question of deference,
had to decide between the two lines of cases it had created. Although Justice Scalia, looking back
at the Chevron case, would later say that “Chevron... essentially chose between these two
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conflicting lines of decision.”54 The Burger Court, while often cited as a period of transition from
the New Deal era to a more conservative political era,55 was a period of administrative
modernization for the courts. Although Chief Justice Burger was not known for elaborate legal
theories and intellectual leadership on the Court, he has been cited as innovating how the courts
approached their increasing workloads.56 This administrative focus is consistent with an
increased commitment to judicial deference by the Burger Court. Bernard Schwartz notes that
“the [Burger] Court has consistently reiterated the theme of deference to administrative
interpretations.”57 The fact that Professor Schwartz himself noted this change in consistency is
particularly striking given that he had decades earlier noted the inconsistent application of
deference under the Warren Court.58 Case by case, the building blocks that would form the
foundation of a more coherent and national judicial deference doctrine in Chevron were laid. The
increased attention to judicial deference, through legislation and case decisions, also generated a
surfeit of academic thought on the subject of deference focused on the administrative benefits
and necessity of judicial deference in the modern administrative state. By consistently
highlighting the administrative aspects of judicial deference, the debate around the doctrine was
shaped in the realm of policy and administration.
One of the earliest Supreme Court administrative law cases of the 1970s was United
States v. City of Chicago (1970). Significantly in this case, the Court, finding a section of the
Interstate Commerce Act ambiguous, gave deference to “the administrative agency given
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oversight of the problem.”59 Deference, in this particular case, was not granted with the
justification of agency expertise or on the “rational-basis” test. It was instead granted by
appealing to the ambiguity of the statute, a concept that would later form the first step of
Chevron’s two-step process. Although there were two dissenters in this decision, Justices Black
and Harlan, a case in the subsequent year, Griggs v. Duke (1971) would unanimously grant
“great deference” to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission with a citation to United
States v. Chicago.
There was also a growing recognition in the judiciary that the Supreme Court’s two
differing case lines on judicial deference were becoming irreconcilable and problematic with the
increase in regulatory cases. In 1975, appellate court Judge Henry Friendly, foreshadowing the
choice that the Supreme Court would have to make in this new political era, wrote that “We
think it is time to recognize… that there are two lines of Supreme Court decisions on this subject
which are analytically in conflict….”60 Awareness of this growing problem had entered the
awareness of the judiciary and was beginning to appear in case law. The 1970s and 1980s were a
time of recognition for the Supreme Court that it would need to choose which line of judicial
deference cases to apply its. The existence of two separate lines of decisions had become an
increasingly large concern and was no longer just an intellectual nuisance for administrative law
experts. With a rise in the number of cases related to complex administrative actions and the rise
in “forum shopping,” a clear approach to judicial deference was needed.
The Court of the 1970s, beyond cases related to the particular area of judicial deference
to agency statutory interpretation, also began to display an increasingly permissive attitude
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towards agencies in other areas of law. Vermont Yankee v. NRDC is one such case dealing with
the autonomy of administrative agencies and the Court’s role in reviewing agency regulations.
Justice Rehnquist, speaking on behalf of a unanimous Court, wrote that “[a]dministrative
decisions should be set aside in this context, as in every other, only for substantial procedural or
substantive reasons… not simply because the court is unhappy with the result reached.”61 Under
Vermont Yankee, courts would be unable to impose additional regulations on agencies beyond
those that are already required by Congress. This would limit the opportunities for judicial
substitution in the future and increase agency autonomy from certain judicial constraints. The
unanimous nature of the decision, and the fact that the author of the Court’s opinion, Justice
Rehnquist, was a Nixon appointee known for his conservative politics, suggests that there were
broader forces at work in this decision than just the attitudinal alignments of the justices. By
deciding not to impose additional regulations in Vermont Yankee, the Court was essentially
deferring the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s expertise on the complex issue of nuclear safety
requirements.
The decision in Vermont Yankee did not go unnoticed and sparked a range of academic
discussions on the role of courts in reviewing agencies. Some articles analyzing Vermont Yankee
soon after the decision, such as Professor Richard Stewart’s discussion,62 argued that the Court
was incorrect in its decision making and should have instead left the agency procedural
requirements open to judicial substitution. Another line of academic thought, however, supported
the Court’s increasingly hands-off approach to agencies. Professor Clark Byse argued in a direct
rebuttal to Stewart that the decision was correct in its entirety and that courts should generally
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avoid “inappropriate judicial intrusion into the day-to-day deployment of agency resources...”63
when deciding cases of agency autonomy. Although the political environment may have become
more suspicious towards agencies, there was still considerable intellectual support for deference
and for limiting judicial policy substitution on administrative ground. Then-professor Stephen
Breyer took an even stronger stance than Byre on the issues of deference involved in Vermont
Yankee, writing that “my only disagreement…[with] the Supreme Court is… that a stringent
standard of review is excessive…[and] the judges are… intruding too deeply upon the
administrative process[.]”64 Much of the literature about judicial deference focused on the
administrative aspects of the doctrine, often citing how the judiciary, as generalists, do not have
the same level as expertise as administrative agencies.
Towards the end of the 1970s, the Court began to abandon parts of its approach to
deference that limited when it would defer to agencies. One of these abandoned components was
how consistent an agency’s interpretation of statute was with “with earlier and later
pronouncements” of statutory interpretation. In this view of deference, the consistency of an
agency’s interpretation of statute was critical to understanding the “one, true” meaning of the
statute in question. If the agency held the same interpretation for a long period of time, it was
more likely to “know” what Congress had originally intended. If it varied its interpretation of
statute, then it was far less likely to understand or advance the original intent of the statute.
Andrus v. Sierra Club (1979) represented a narrow, but real, retreat from this principle.
Justice Brennan, writing on behalf of a unanimous Court, argued that “the interpretation of [the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969] by the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ)
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under its current mandatory regulations is entitled to substantial deference even though the
regulations reverse CEQ’s interpretation under earlier advisory guidelines….”65 Although the
Court justified this particular departure by highlighting the fact that the CEQ was changing
advisory guidelines to mandatory regulations, the Court was, crucially, approaching interpretive
consistency from a different angle than it had previously. Justice Scalia would later argue in
1989 that the “consistency of pronouncement” approach “makes no sense when we acknowledge
that the agency is free to give the statute whichever of several possible meanings it thinks most
conducive to the accomplishment of statutory purpose.”66 Rather than looking to consistency to
find the “correct” interpretation of statute in Andrus, the Court instead deferred to the agency on
whether or not its new interpretation of the statute was the best approach to its current demands,
in this case whether the agency’s new interpretation provided the best approach to creating new,
mandatory regulations.
Conclusion
The beginnings of the judicial deference doctrine that led to Chevron were fraught with
inconsistency and a general lack of attention by the courts. When it suited judges to appeal to
judicial deference on cases where they supported the agency’s decisions, they did so. When they
did not agree with agencies, however, judges often did not even mention judicial deference.
Agencies were not generally presumed to be given deference. Neither the judiciary not the other
branches of government were particularly focused on judicial deference immediately after the
passage of the APA. With neither party particularly concerned about deference, and absent other
pressures, the Court often decided agency cases based on whether or not it agreed with the
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agency, using deference after the fact only to justify its agreement. Judicial deference to
agencies, and the scope of review in general, was not been clear or straightforward for this large
portion of the Court’s history. This period of conflicting judicial pronouncements on deference,
lasting for almost 20 years, was followed by a sudden and consistent commitment to strong
deference. Changes in the administrative challenges faced by the judiciary during the 1970s
proved key to pressuring the Court into choosing between the two irreconcilable lines of cases on
judicial deference. To defer or not defer was the question of the time for the judiciary.
Administrative necessity, rather than the attitudes of any particular justices, compelled the Court
to consider new ways to stem the tide of increasingly complex agency regulatory cases, one of
which was through an increased judicial deference. The previous system of judicial deference to
agencies, or rather the lack of one, proved inadequate to address the new needs of the courts
under the administrative state.
The transition from chaotic use of judicial deference in the 1950s and 1960s was one of
the ways the Court sought to cope with increased caseloads and with increased divisions in the
lower court which led to “forum shopping.” Indeed, some of the previous methods of deciding
deference, such as the fact-law distinction, were unworkable in a practical sense, as they left too
much up to the discretion of individual judges and relied on shifting definitions of the words.
Although these issues had been tolerable when before the large proliferation in administrative
rule making, they quickly began to consume much time and resources as agency cases ballooned
almost out of control within a relatively short time. The Court during the 1970s was on its own
trajectory towards judicial deference, one that resulted in stronger and more consistent deference
to agencies on a variety of issues.
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Chapter 3: The Bumpers on the Road to Chevron and the Judicial Deference in the Chevron Heyday

The Court’s push towards judicial deference, while primarily an administrative concern
in the judiciary, became a political and policy concern in the other branches of government. The
courts do not exist in a vacuum, especially in areas of overlapping power like administrative law.
In order to understand the course of Chevron it is important not only to recognize why the Court
began its push towards judicial deference, but also to examine why it was allowed to do so in a
time of increasing skepticism of agencies. To understand this, it is necessary to explore the
surrounding political environment. With the start of the Reagan Administration, deregulating the
economy and reducing the power of administrative agencies became major issue snot only in the
executive branch, but also within Congress. In particular, there was an uncharacteristically
energetic debate about the desirability of judicial deference to administrative agencies involving
the Bumpers Amendment. Although these pressures had been building within the Republican
Party, there was also widespread support for the elimination of judicial deference across party
lines. As the courts continued their trajectory towards increased deference, compelled by
administrative and caseload concerns, politicians from both sides of the aisle became
increasingly concerned by what they saw as an excessive, enabling amount of deference from the
courts. Ironically, however, it may have been that election of Ronald Reagan and the executiveoriented approach to deregulation that saved judicial deference and allowed for its expansion in
Chevron.
The ultimate failure of Congress to pass legislation limiting judicial deference can be
explained by the way that the issue of deference cut across existing party lines. Although strong
political regimes can influence Supreme Court decisions, the ruling political regime is often
weak or unfocused on specific policy areas. Mark Graber argues that, when these areas of
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weakness arise in political debate, Congress defers to the courts in deciding the outcome.67 If
divisions within both major political parties on a particular issue are great, then party leaders
tend to let the judiciary decide the issue, rather than Congress, in order to avoid debate on the
issue and lower its political salience. Importantly, Gruber also suggests that “legislative
deference at times need consist of little more than refusing to restrain justices already committed
to settling a particular political controversy.”68 In other words, Congress often recognizes when
the courts seem to be on a trajectory to solve a particular political issue. When that happens, the
decision facing Congress is whether or not to allow the courts to reach their terminus. A divided
Congress can avoid a politically contentious issue simply by choosing to do nothing. This type of
tacit legislative deference to the judiciary is important to understanding the debate on judicial
deference and the so-called Bumpers Amendment just before Chevron and, through that, the
decision of Chevron itself.
Bumpers in the Pre-Reagan Era
One of the most significant debates about judicial deference after the APA and prior to
Chevron centered around the Bumpers Amendment, named for Senator Dale Bumpers (D-AR).
As the Court’s preference towards using deference as an administrative tool to help control
caseloads became clearer, Congress began serious debate into potentially limiting judicial
deference to agencies as part of a wider discussion on limiting agency regulations and power.
The Bumpers Amendment to the Administrative Procedure Act, proposed three times in three
consecutive congresses by Senator Bumper, sought to impose changes to the APA that would
limit how and when the courts deferred to agencies. Although the language in the bill changed
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substantially with each of its three introductions, perhaps a reflection of the complexities and
confusion surrounding judicial deference, the third, 1979 version of the Bumper Amendment
directed courts to increase their review of administrative agency regulation and stated that “there
shall be no presumption that any rule or regulation of any agency is valid and… the [reviewing]
court shall not uphold the validity of such challenged rule or regulation…[without] a
preponderance of evidence.”69 The bill also included provisions that precluded the courts from
showing any deference to agencies on questions of law, such as statutory interpretation. As in the
past, however, critics of the Bumpers Amendment noted that the fact-law distinction was tenuous
at best and practically non-existent at worst.70 The Bumpers Amendment generated a significant
amount of controversy and elevated the issue of judicial deference into a realm of greater
national discussion.71
The third version of the Bumpers Amendment passed the Senate unanimously in 1979
and received bipartisan co-sponsorship from a diverse group of four senators, two Democrats and
two Republican, including Republican senator and former presidential nominee Barry Goldwater
(R-AZ), who famously warned that the administrative state was becoming “a vast national
authority out of touch with the people, and out of their control.”72 The ideological variation in
supporters of the Bumpers Amendment, championed by a liberal Democrat and a conservative
Republican, presents a strange puzzle for judicial deference. Senator Bumpers, in a speech
supporting the bill, declared that “Citizen groups of all kinds… are unanimous in explaining
that… regulations issued by the executive or administrative agencies [have] become too
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intrusive…[.]”73 It is unclear, however, what exactly Congress intended by the language of the
amendment. A report submitted to the Administrative Conference of the United States, authored
by Ronald Levin, illustrated the myriad ambiguities the text of the Bumpers Amendment and
argued that these ambiguities made passing the amendment inadvisable.74 In fact, Levin notes
that “some [remarks in support of the bill] in the legislative history [of the bill] seem drastically
at odd with the text of the statute itself.”75
Beyond the ambiguities of the text of the statute itself, it is important to note that the
Bumpers Amendment was formulated and first proposed during the Carter Administration.
Administrative agencies during the Carter years were headed by proponents of strong economic
regulation,76 putting the administration at odds with other political actors in Congress who
sought to deregulate the economy. It is possible that without strong executive action to
deregulate and reduce agency regulations, the political pressures for deregulation were channeled
into Congress. Rather than attempt to limit regulatory power through increase statutory
specificity, which would be difficult under any circumstances, forcing the courts to abandon
deference to agencies through the Bumpers Amendment was a simpler and easier way to
demonstrate a commitment to reducing agency power. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the Bumpers
Amendment was opposed by the Carter administration.77 Although the Bumpers Amendment
was reintroduced to Congress numerous times, the final death knell for the bill, the last bump on
the road to Chevron, was not any sort of positive change in attitudes towards regulation. Rather,
the election of a president dedicated to deregulation in 1980 provided an alternative path to
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restricting agency regulations that not only rendered the Bumper amendment, with all its
problems, not only unnecessary but also counterproductive.
The Reagan Administration and Judicial Deference
The Reagan Administration, famous for its vocal hostility to administration agency
regulation, seemed to be supportive of the Bumpers Amendment at first. In line with the previous
Republican Party platforms, the 1980 platform that Reagan ran on included, as a core plank, a
stated recognition that “there are dangers inherent in the rapid growth of the federal bureaucracy,
especially the arbitrary nature of its discretionary power and the abuses of procedural
safeguards” and that this trend was exacerbated by over-delegation of power from Congress.78 It
is important to note that the focus of this particular plank lay on the role of the executive and of
Congress in determining and limiting the scope of administrative agencies. It is worth noting that
the platform plank involving the judiciary was significantly shorter in both length and attention
to detail than the plank involving administrative agencies and Congress. Focus on deregulation
was directed, generally, at Congress and the executive than at the courts.
Although the Reagan Administration verbally committed support for reducing the “size
and scope of the executive Branch,” the actual actions of the Administration differed from this
promise significantly and ultimately set the stage for Chevron by dividing Congressional
opinions on judicial deference to agencies and by creating an even larger amount of case work by
accelerating controversial deregulations. This particular paradox of the Reagan era approach to
agencies, that the Administration sought to weaken regulation by empowering the regulators,
was highlighted by the response from Reagan’s attorney general, William French Smith, to the
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Court’s decision in INS v. Chadha.79 Although the case itself dealt with the implementation of a
legislative veto and with executive discretion, which is not entirely the same as deference to
agencies or even agency autonomy, Smith signaled a possible openness to deference, in his
defense of the decision from criticisms that it would cause executive overreach, saying “if [the
decision in INS v. Chadha] encourages Congress to exercise greater restrain when it delegates
power to administrative agencies, that is not a loss to the President… it is as inappropriate and
unworkable for… the judiciary to do Congress’s job…”80 Smith’s line of reasoning suggests that
it is Congress that ought to be clear when it delegates power to agencies to enunciate the specific
limitations to that delegated power. If Congress did not like the way that agencies were
interpreting their statutes, Smith argued Congress should “overturn bad regulations with proper
legislation.” The general political atmosphere supported deregulation through the executive,
Reagan Administration, rather than directly through the courts. Indeed, it appears that, at least in
Chadha, the Reagan Administration used the decision as a way to further secure its executive
focused method of deregulation from the Congress.
The Reagan Administration encouraged this approach to deregulation in the context of
judicial deference to agency statutory interpretation. The fourth iteration of the Bumpers
Amendment, introduced in 1981, reignited debate about whether or not Congress should force an
end to the courts’ growing deference. This version of the Bumpers Amendment was far more
limited in its scope than the previous versions of the amendment, merely calling for “substantial
evidence” instead of a the “preponderance of evidence” in the previous versions.81 Although the
goals of the Bumpers Amendment, eliminating deference to agency statutory interpretation and,
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therefore, weakening the regulatory power of agencies, would seem to be in line with the goals
of Reagan era deregulation, the new amendment became a cause of increasing concern in the
new administration as time went on.
Bumpers in the Reagan Era
The Bumpers Amendment of 1981 was the final time the statute was proposed, ultimately
dying when the House failed to vote on the bill. Examining the hearings on the Regulatory
Procedures Act of 1981,82 which the Bumpers Amendment was attached to, illustrates the
political, intra-party fractures that developed during the start of the Reagan Administration.
These cracks, which represent divergent views of how exactly the economy should be
deregulated, help explain why Congress failed to, or perhaps decided not to, interfere with the
courts’ developing doctrine of increased judicial deference. In line with Graber’s theory of
legislative deference to the judiciary, Congress may have decided to merely defer to the judiciary
on the matter of judicial deference to administrative agencies, choosing a hands-off approach and
allowing the courts to reach their own decision regarding deference in Chevron.
Although Republicans, and many Democrats, at the start of the Reagan Administration
supported the Bumpers Amendment on deregulatory grounds, divisions in the Republican camp
began to appear soon after Reagan’s election. Some politicians sought to limit regulations by
limiting the power of administrative agencies to interpret their own statutory directives. This
approach, which was embodied by the Bumpers Amendment, would have reduced the power and
flexibility of the agencies themselves and made difficult the implementation of new regulations
by forcing courts to engage in a “closer look” at Congressional intent in statutes. Critics of this

82

Hearings before the Subcommittee on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the Committee on the
Judiciary, House of Representatives, Regulatory Procedures Act of 1981, H.R. 746, Serial No. 27 (1981)

42

approach argue that it also restricts agencies from potentially deregulating. In the first year of
the Reagan Administration, Frank Swain, general counsel for the Federation of Independent
Businesses, voiced his concern that the Bumpers Amendment, if passed, would be “a doubleedged sword for the Reagan people.”83 Deregulation often involves a reinterpretation of statute in
order to justify why deregulation is permissible. If agency regulation was, previously, compelled
by statute, then the removal of that same regulation is difficult to justify without reinterpreting
the original statute.84 As noted in the previous chapter, consistency of agency “pronouncement”
was an important factor that the courts considered when trying to discern the true Congressional
intent behind statute. Although this may not have been a concern under the relatively regulation
friendly Carter administration, the heightened level of deregulation under Reagan brought the
courts into conflict with agencies attempting to deregulation.85
This criticism did not go unacknowledged during the debate over Bumpers and became a
major concern of opponents of the amendment. The elimination of judicial deference
experienced significant opposition from the intellectual legal community. During a hearing on
the Regulatory Procedure Act of 1981, Mark Rosenberg, chairman of the Select Committee on
Regulatory Reform for the Federal Bar Association, argued that “[deregulation] could, however,
be hampered severely in some areas if this provision makes courts less able to defer to agency
judgements” and that “…this amendment could actually hamper the deregulation and fine-tune
effort which… many people in Congress support.”86 Even within the Republican members of
Congress, there was a divide over the Bumpers Amendment. Congressman Ed Bethune, a
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Republican from Arkansas, expressed his opposition to the Bumpers Amendment, arguing that
rather than pass the amendment “Congress can and must limit the scope of [agencies’] areas of
responsibility to specific areas…[and] we have to stop playing games with the process and begin
to concentrate on the substance.”87 Even ardent supports of the bill acknowledged that the
Bumpers Amendment could hamper deregulation efforts, with Congressman Robert McClory,
who sponsored the Bumpers Amendment in the House, admitting that “I can’t help but agree that
[the Bumpers Amendment] would complicated our task [of deregulation].”88
Within the Democratic Party, there were similar divisions about the Bumpers
Amendment. Senator Bumpers himself was a Democrat and other members of the party
supported his proposal, with Congressman Don Pease (D-OH) submitting a statement in support
of the amendment. Other Democrats, John Conyers (D-MI) and Robert Drinan (D-MA) opposed
the bill, saying “this amendment is unwise and unnecessary.”89 Both parties experience divides
on the issue of judicial deference to agencies. These divides could not be easily reconciled, if at
all. Passing Bumpers, and eliminating judicial deference, would have been antithetical to the
executive focused deregulation that depended upon deference. In examining why the Bumpers
Amendment and Congressional efforts to restrict judicial deference failed, it is important to look
beyond just the opinion in Congress and to take a look at the growing dissatisfaction in the White
House with limited deference.
Although the Bumpers Amendment was part of a larger effort to engage in deregulation,
the newly elected Reagan Administration quickly soured on the idea of eliminating judicial
deference. McClory recognized that, by May of 1981, the Reagan Administration was
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experiencing “second thoughts about the Bumpers Amendment.”90 During that same hearing,
Edward C. Schmults, the deputy attorney-general under Reagan, expressed his concern that “an
agency should be accorded some deference as to the meaning of its own regulations.”91 By this
time, the Reagan Administration was beginning to publicly express its dissatisfaction with
forcing the courts to review agency regulations de novo, without deference. By October of 1981,
opposition to the Bumpers Amendment had become prevalent within the Reagan Administration.
Opposition to the Bumpers Amendment in the administration began to grow once it
became clear that the amendment was a double-edged sword. The elimination of judicial
deference that could hamper the introduction of new regulations could also impede the
elimination of old ones. In a briefing to President Reagan prepared in advance of a meeting
between Senator Bumpers and the President, Reagan’s legislative assistant, Max Friedersdorf,
expressed concern that the Bumpers Amendment, if passed, would “make it easier for this
Administration’s opponents to challenge deregulation in the courts.”92 The Reagan
Administration was worried that reduced deference would not only complicate efforts to
deregulate, but would also to provide opponents of deregulation a new channel through which to
combat the Reagan administration. Friedersdorf also noted, to help explain the possible antiregulatory effects of the amendment, that “the amendment was developed some time ago to
make it easier for the business community to challenge Carter Administration regulations.”93
This explanation for the Bumpers Amendment illustrates that the amendment was seen, at
least in part, by the Reagan Administration as an artifact of the previous Carter Administration
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and no longer necessary under the new administration. In this view, the Bumpers Amendment
may have made sense when the executive was committed to maintaining a strong regulatory
scheme, but the presence of an executive dedicated to deregulation made the amendment more of
a liability than an asset. After all, an agency’s previous interpretation of its statute was regarded
as a way to determine Congressional intent and deregulatory actions often involved
reinterpretation of statute.94 Reagan’s talking points for the meeting with Senator Bumpers
stressed a need to “make sure our deregulatory efforts are not thwarted by an ambiguous
interpretation of [his amendment].” However, the “ambiguous interpretation” of the Bumpers
Amendment, which allowed for it to be interpreted in many different ways, was one of the ways
that supporters of the amendment hoped to collect enough votes for passage. Representative
Danielson, in the earlier hearings on the Regulatory Procedures Act, expressed his belief that
“Bumpers was sufficiently vague so that… we could get those votes which are nailed to the mast
of Bumpers.”95 The vagueness that concerned the Reagan Administration was, like in many
Congressional statutes, important in getting sufficient votes.
The Reagan administration’s stance towards Bumpers was representative of its larger
view towards judicial deference. In cases such as the State Farm (1981) case cited above, the
Administration argued that there was a need for more judicial deference, not less, in the areas
undergoing deregulation. In particular, Rex E. Lee, the solicitor general under Reagan, argued in
State Farm that “a court must be extremely reluctant under the APA to set aside an agency's
decision to rescind a regulation that was not required by its authorizing statute, irrespective of
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whatever standard of reasonableness is applicable to the promulgation of the regulation.”96
Although the Court voted unanimously against the Reagan Administration’s attempt to rescind
regulations in State Farm, the Administration continued to argue that judicial deference was
necessary to promote deregulation. This executive preference for judicial deference proved not
only important in defeating the Bumpers Amendment, but also in influencing the Court’s
decision in Chevron v. NRDC and providing the foundations for strong judicial deference to
agency statutory interpretation.
Chevron v. NRDC
The decision of Chevron was made with an irregular voting panel of justices. Two of the
most conservative members of the Court, Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor, were both
absent from the decision, along with Justice Thurgood Marshall, who was sick at the time of the
decision. At issue was whether or not the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was able to
reinterpret the meaning of the statutory term “source,” referring to sources of air pollution. The
Court voted to defer to the EPA’s interpretation of the Clean Air Act. It has often been noted
that the Chevron decision was not seen as a landmark by the Supreme Court when being written,
rather it was just a restatement of the Court’s previous standard of deference in a new way.97
That Chevron drew upon previously decided standards for deference certainly true given that the
two-steps of the “two-step” process of Chevron, ambiguity of Congressional statute and
reasonableness of the agency interpretation, appeared, as discussed above, in Supreme Court
decision throughout the 1970s. But even if Chevron was just a condensation of previous case
law, it is no coincidence that the case occurred only a few years after the end of the Bumpers
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Amendment and Congress’s attempt to restrict judicial deference. Chevron marked conclusively
that the Court had chosen the judicial deference to agencies line of cases over the judgement
substitution line of cases. Although the Court had already been favoring judicial deference in
order to control caseloads for many years, Chevron was the definitive next step in that trend.
The influences of the Reagan Administration, which had long pushed for judicial
deference to agencies, are apparent throughout the case. Justice Stevens wrote in the Chevron
decision that “judges…are not part of either political branch of the Government…[and] while
agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief executive is…”98 Although a novel
innovation on Justice Stevens’s part, one that Thomas Merrill argues “broke new ground…as a
reason for deferring to agency interpretations,”99 this idea parallels with William French Smith’s
defense of INS v. Chadha. This justification for the Chevron decision shifted the issue of
regulatory change to the executive and follows in line with the desires of the Reagan
Administration as articulated by Smith. Under Chevron, if the Congress wanted to overturn bad
regulations, it could do so with legislation clarifying its original intent. Otherwise, it would be up
to the discretion of the administrative agency to interpret its statutory directive as it saw fit for
regulatory purposes.
The Reagan Administration’s arguments during the case were also clearly reflected in the
final outcome of the decision. One of the core holdings of the Chevron case was that judicial
deference could apply merely when the statute was silent on the issue and that it was not
necessary that there be an explicit grant to discretion to the agency. Paul Bator, the deputy
solicitor general under Reagan, argued in the oral argument that the EPA’s discretion in
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interpreting the Clean Air Act could only be eliminated by “positive law,” a clear statement by
Congress forbidding a particular interpretation. The Solicitor General’s brief similarly
emphasized the “implied delegation” of interpretative power from Congress to the EPA in the
Clean Air Act.100 That these arguments appeared in the final Chevron decision indicates that the
Court was convinced by the Reagan Administration’s arguments for increased judicial deference.
The relatively wide ruling of Chevron had far-reaching effects, not the least because many
congressional statutes have vague and ambiguous provisions in an attempt to collect the votes
necessary to pass.
Chevron presented a clear application of judicial deference in the context of deregulation,
allowing the EPA to reinterpret the Clean Air Act in a way that lessened the regulatory burdens
on pollution producing factories. Judicial deference to agency statutory interpretation was not
just a liberal construct to allow agencies to impose regulations beyond the intention of Congress,
as it had been viewed during the Carter Administration. Instead, it could be used as a tool to
justify increasing and sudden agency deregulation. Under the previous “consistency of
interpretation” criterion, agencies would have difficulty attaining judicial deference if it tried to
remove a long standing regulation it had previously said was statutorily required. Chevron
solidified a place for deference under a conservative political regime. The decision in Chevron
was in many ways what the Reagan Administration had already been pushing for when it began
to oppose the Bumpers Amendment. Under an Administration that sought to engage in
deregulation through the office of the President, deference to more narrow interpretations of
Congressional statues by agencies would be a tool too valuable to eliminate in the name of
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separation of powers, as Bumpers sought to do, particularly when a conservative sat in the White
House.
Creating the Chevron Doctrine from Chevron v. NRDC
Interestingly, Chevron was not initially seen as a particularly far-reaching case and
certainly not the landmark Supreme Court case it is today. Merrill notes that “Chevron was little
noticed when it was decided, and came to be regarded as a landmark case only some years
later.”101 For all the controversy surrounding the Bumpers Amendment in 1981, concerns about
judicial deference to agencies had evaporated by the time Chevron was decided in 1984. This
silence is perhaps the clearest indicator of how thoroughly the debate had subsided in Congress.
Concerns in Congress about executive overreach facilitated by judicial deference had given way
to a tacit acceptance of agency interpretive power. Despite the previous intensive scrutiny of
judicial deference, the decision in Chevron was accepted without so much as a second glance
when it was first decided. Although the Chevron decision may not have been noticed much in the
legislative branch, its uptake in both the executive and judicial branches demonstrates the extent
to which Chevron was important to those two branches.
Support for the newly minted Chevron doctrine by executive lawyers helped transform
the case into a landmark. Merrill argues that “Chevron was regarded as a godsend by executive
Branch lawyers… who push relentlessly102 to capitalize on the perceived advantages the decision
presented.” Given the emphasis that the Reagan Administration had placed on judicial deference
even before Chevron, advocacy for Chevron by executive lawyers is not surprising. What this
does highlight, however, is the contrast between reactions from the legislative and executive
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branches. Where Congress was silent, the executive was quick to make noise in supporting
Chevron. Judicial deference was critical to executive-oriented deregulation, and the executive
branch seized on Chevron as an opportunity to incorporate strong judicial deference into existing
judicial canon. Chevron provided a clear way for the executive to express its desire for deference
from the courts. As a clear case providing a strong level of deference, lawyers beating the drum
of Chevron forced the courts to acknowledge that they had an obligation to try and apply the
Chevron doctrine in administrative law.
One of the single most significant things that President Reagan did to solidify the
supremacy of Chevron was the appointment of Antonin Scalia to the Supreme Court. Scalia, who
later became known as Chevron’s premier defender on the Court,103 had previously participated
in the hearings on the Bumpers Amendment. A prepared statement by then-professor Scalia
argued that “[the attitude of supporters of the Bumpers Amendment] promises to do major harm
to the drive for genuine regulatory reform.”104 Scalia’s support for judicial deference had existed
before Chevron and was made quite public during the Bumpers Amendment. Interestingly,
Scalia’s support of judicial deference to agency statutory interpretation was apparently not of
much concern during his Supreme Court confirmation hearing in 1986, with only a brief mention
made in the testimony.105 Although it is difficult to discern whether or not Scalia’s evident
support for judicial deference was a factor in his nomination, his ascension to associate justice
was a boon for the doctrine. Just over a year after his appointment to the Supreme Court, Justice
Scalia wrote a concurring opinion in NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers supporting
Chevron deference, saying “our decision demonstrates the continuing and unchanged vitality of
103

(Scalia 1989)
(Regulatory Procedures Act of 1981: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Administrative Law and Government
Relations 1981, 109)
105
(NLRB v. Food & Commercial Workers 1987)
104

51

the test for judicial review of agency determinations of law set forth in [Chevron].”106 Scalia’s
enthusiastic support for Chevron pushed the Supreme Court to continually reaffirm its support
for the doctrine
While appointing Scalia to associate justice helped maintain the doctrine in the Supreme
Court, Chevron was especially influential as a guiding doctrine for the lowers courts. The
Chevron decision was quickly accepted in the lower courts, particularly the D.C. Circuit, as a
way of handling cases involving complex agency rulemaking.107 A later study of Chevron
applications in the circuit courts found that “in Chevron, the Supreme Court has an effective tool
to supervise lower courts’ review of agency statutory interpretations.”108 In theory, if not always
in practice, Chevron would help create more predictable legal outcomes by inducing reviewing
courts to substitute their judgement for that of the agencies less often. Acceptance of Chevron in
the lower courts made Chevron increasingly important as a decision.
For almost two decades after the Chevron decision, the scope of the doctrine remained
mostly consistent. With the exception of Lechmere v. NLRB109, which held that Chevron
deference does not supersede Supreme Court precedent, the question surrounding the doctrine
was not how it should be applied and to what regulations, but when to apply it. Cases that
suggested limiting the scope of Chevron110 were abandoned before they could gain traction in
limiting the doctrine. Despite the anti-judicial deference pressures in Congress that had preceded
Chevron, strong judicial deference to agencies had established itself as the foremost approach to
administrative law cases.

106

Ibid.
(Merill 2014)
108
(Barnett and Walker 2017)
109
(Lechmere, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board 1992)
110
See, e.g. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987)
107

52

Conclusion
The political path to Chevron illustrates the tension between the Supreme Court and other
government institutions. Many members of Congress pressed for the Bumpers Amendment as
one practical avenue of limiting agency regulatory power. This would have created a courtcentric barrier to regulation, although barriers to deregulation would have increased as well.
With the election of Ronald Reagan to the White House, an alternative pathway of deregulation
focused on executive action and agency appointment opened up that was irreconcilable with the
elimination of deference. With Congress increasingly split between these two camps and the
Reagan Administration pushing against deference limitations, the issue was left to the courts.
Chevron was not a decision at odds with the deregulatory spirit of the time. It was instead the
product of a conflict between two competing theories of regulatory limitation. The Reagan
Administration encouraged decisions like Chevron because it felt that in order to shrink the
regulatory impact of agencies, it needed to grow the discretionary powers of the agencies.
Through executive lawyers and Supreme Court appointments, Chevron the doctrine was a
product of the political preferences of the executive, even if Chevron the case was driven by
other, administrative concerns.
It is important to note, however, that “legislative deference to the judiciary may not
reduce the intensity of public debate over a crosscutting issue in the long run.”111 Although
Reagan-era deregulation released the immediate tension surrounding judicial deference to
agencies, the concern over the scope of deference was not eliminated. Although the salience of
judicial deference may have faded for a time, the issue itself was never completely resolved.
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Chapter 4: Chevron in Flux and the Future of the Doctrine

Dissenting over the major changes to the Chevron doctrine made in U.S. v. Mead (2001),
Justice Scalia warned that “[w]e will be sorting out the consequences of the Mead doctrine… for
years to come.”112 Although Justice Scalia’s dissent was focused on how the Court would
respond, the period of change initiated by Mead had ramification beyond just the judiciary,
spreading throughout the other branches of government. The Chevron doctrine had helped
resolve, or at least clarify, the Court’s approach to judicial deference for a time, but the doctrine
has undergone substantial change since 2000. Since then, the Supreme Court has made a number
of rulings attempting to better define the full scope and limitations of the doctrine, both severely
limiting when the doctrine can be applied113 but also greatly expanding its influence in cases
where it is applied.114
This chapter examines how the changing frame of judicial deference in the courts
allowed conservatives in Congress to constitutionalize Chevron. By tracking the legal
development of Chevron since 2000 and paying particular attention to how the framing of
Chevron and judicial deference changed, it becomes clear that Chevron transitioned from an
issue of administrative importance to one of constitutional importance. Each of the major cases
raised either constitutional concern or else seemed to imply that it was ultimately Congress’s
responsibility to state the boundaries of judicial deference. These constitutional ideas are also
reflected in the renewed debates surrounding Chevron, suggesting that the constitutional
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concerns raised in the judiciary and by legal academics has created a foundation for
constitionalizing Chevron in the political branches.
These modifications to the Chevron doctrine were not successful in clarifying the extent
of judicial deference and only muddied the issue further. These confusions opened the doctrine
up to substantial criticism on a number of fronts, ranging from separation of powers issues to the
practical difficulties of using a complex, multifaceted doctrine. While these changes have made
the judicial application of the doctrine more difficult, they have created other avenues of
criticism towards judicial deference that have helped unify critics of the doctrine. In the two most
recent Congresses, there has been a resurgence in the debate over judicial deference, centered in
part around the Separation of Powers Restoration Act (SOPRA), which would force the courts to
consider issues of agency interpretation of statute de novo, without deference. Although the
ultimate objective of SOPRA is the same as the Bumpers Amendment, the rationale for SOPRA
differs significantly from Bumpers.
This most recent debate around judicial deference, with a particular focus on Chevron,
illustrates how issues like judicial deference, which lies at an intersection between all three
branches of government, are particularly vulnerable to attack from many different angles. Where
judicial deference, as an abstract concept, was able to survive the push towards deregulation
because it became an issue that cut across segments of both political parties the Chevron doctrine
as the practical manifestation of judicial deference to agency interpretation creates a single target
for criticism. In particular, criticism of judicial deference has shifted from the area of
deregulation to the area of separation of powers. Professor Turley notes that “…how Chevron is
viewed differs [depending on] whether you view it from a constitutional standpoint or from an
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administrative law standpoint….115” During the 1980s, judicial deference was approached from
an administrative standpoint, focusing on how it affects the proliferation of agency rules. The
academic opposition that existed during the Bumpers-era was neither as vocal nor as prolific in
the case of SOPRA, despite both having the same effects. Framing the issue as a matter of
separation-of-powers rather than an issue of placing “the bureaucratic thumb on the scales of
justice,” judicial deference is shifted from an issue that cuts across the political regime to one
that the political system is more equipped to handle. As the boundaries of judicial deference were
tested and criticism of the doctrine is redirected towards less cross-cutting lenses, Congress again
became less willing to continue their own deference to the judiciary and issues that were
temporarily suppressed may once again become salient in the eyes of Congress.
Mead, Brand X, City of Arlington, and Burwell: Changes to the Chevron Doctrine in the 21st
Century
One of the most striking aspects of the changes made to the Chevron doctrine is that there
is neither a clear, constant retreat from the judicial deference nor a sustained expansion in
Chevron’s scope. Although the Supreme Court has issued a number of rulings related to
Chevron, four cases in particular standout as significant changes to the doctrine. Each of these
four cases altered the scope of Chevron in a way that either shifted the theoretical foundations of
judicial deference towards a delegation justification or exposed the doctrine to increased
criticism from a separation of powers perspective. These cases also brought forward the divisions
within the Court on the issue of judicial deference and resulted in splits within the judiciary.
Richard Pierce notes that “the only thing that emerges clearly from these opinions is that the
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Justices differ significantly with respect to their views on the scope of Chevron.”116 The Court’s
changing view of Chevron paved the way for future criticisms of the doctrine that returned
judicial deference to the focus of Congress and the dominant political regime. Many of these
broad changes to Chevron have reinforced the role of Congress as the ultimate arbiter in the field
of judicial deference to agencies.
The first case in particular, U.S. v. Mead (2001),117 raised the possibility that Chevron
may not be entirely justifiable on separation of powers grounds and that judicial deference is
ultimately a creature of the legislative branch. The Mead case represents the first major change to
the Chevron doctrine since its inception in 1984. The decision limited the application of Chevron
deference to cases where the agency makes a regulation with the force of law, i.e. in cases where
the regulation has undergone formal rule-making procedures. In cases where the agency
regulation does not have the force of law, such as a tariff schedule, Chevron deference does not
apply and the Court instead relies upon the Skidmore balancing test to determine whether or not
to accept the agency’s interpretation. This new version of Chevron, sometimes called the Mead
doctrine, significantly changed the scope and rationale for judicial deference. After Mead,
Chevron deference would only be accorded only if there was an “indication on the statute’s face
that Congress meant to delegate authority to [the agency].”118 Although this “indication” could
arise implicitly through the formal rule making process, the need for this type of indication
greatly limited the applicability of Chevron deference. In practice, this meant that not all
authoritative agency rules were qualified for Chevron deference.
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Beyond simply limiting Chevron deference, Mead was significant for revitalizing the
Skidmore balancing test. A key difference under Skidmore is that once the Court has ruled on the
correct interpretation of a statute, the meaning of that statute is then set in stone without further
rulings from the Supreme Court. By reviving Skidmore, the Court retakes the ability to substitute
its own policy judgements for those of the agencies, shifting away from the separation-of-powers
justification119 for strong deference. Ilya Sharpiro argues that “Mead…makes it clear that
Chevron deference does not arise directly from constitutional separation-of-powers principles…
[and therefore] Congress could by statute eliminate the Chevron doctrine.”120 One of the
innovations of the Chevron doctrine discussed earlier was its appeal to democratic theory and the
relative “political accountability” of the executive over the judiciary as a rationale for judicial
deference.
Mead shifted away from the separation-of-power argument by suggesting that judicial
deference is more justified as a matter of delegation of power from Congress to agencies than as
a matter of judicial restraint. Then-law professor Elena Kagan and David Barron argue that
“Mead represents the apotheosis of… the treatment of Chevron as congressional choice, rather
than either a constitutional mandate or judicial doctrine.”121 The Court defers to agencies not
because of a concern that unelected judges ought not to substitute their own policy views for
those of a more accountable agency. Rather, the Court defers to agencies because it believes that
Congress willed the agency a degree of flexibility in the matter. The Mead decision made the
Chevron doctrine, and judicial deference in general, vulnerable on the grounds that judicial
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deference to agency interpretations was essentially under the control of Congress, rather than
being an exercise in restraint by the courts.
Another issue raised by Mead was the administrative problem of “ossification” of
statutory interpretation by the courts. Decisions made under weaker deference, like Skidmore
deference, are subject to reversal only through subsequent court decisions. Justice Scalia was
particularly concerned with ossification, warning that “it will be positively bizarre when
[ossification] occurs simply because of an agency’s failure to act by rulemaking before the issue
is presented to the courts.”122 Although the issue of ossification was one internal to the judiciary,
the concern surrounding it was enough to motivate the Court to undertake the next major change
to the scope of the Chevron doctrine in National Telecommunications Services v. Brand X
Internet Services (2005).123
The decision in Brand X generated a substantial amount of controversy centered around
its approach to judicial deference and stare decisis. In the decision, the Court ruled, eight to one,
that agency rules subject to Chevron deference not only overpower previous agency
interpretations of the same statute, but also supersede any interpretations of that statute made by
the lower courts. Brand X essentially split the Chevron doctrine in two, with one type of Chevron
applying to the Supreme Court and another type applying to circuit courts. The Supreme Court,
which is not subject to executive reversal of decision making under Brand X, operates under
Chevron Supreme, while the lower courts operate under Chevron regular.124 Justice Scalia,
dissenting, argues that “the Court today moves to solve [ossification] of its own creation by
inventing yet another breathtaking novelty: judicial decisions subject to reversal by executive
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officers.”125 This concern, that officers from the executive branch can reverse the decisions of
lower courts, raised separation-of-powers concerns. Indeed, Scalia calls the decision in Brand X
“not only bizarre…[but] probably unconstitutional.” Although the empirical effects of Brand X
are debated,126 a common criticism of the decision, supported or not, is that it creates a tear in the
separation-of-powers between the judiciary and the executive. Abbe Gluck argues that the
significance of the decisions rests in the “wholesale transfer of statutory interpretation authority
from federal courts to agencies.”127 The Brand X decision, although based on an administrative
desire to avoid the ossification of statute, greatly increased concerns surrounding the relationship
between judicial deference and separation-of-powers.
The Court’s expansion of Chevron deference continued in City of Arlington, TX v.
FFC.128 This majority opinion in this case expanded Chevron deference by ruling that agencies
themselves could interpret their own statutes regarding jurisdiction. Essentially, it was now up to
the discretion of agencies, subject to Chevron, to determine where and when the boundaries of
their jurisdictions end. Testifying before the Committee on the judiciary, Professor Turley
expressed separation-of-powers concerns about allowing agencies to determine the scope of their
own jurisdictions, saying “we always assume that would be the Rubicon, at least agencies
wouldn’t get deference on defining their own jurisdiction. And I think Congress needs to attack
that very aggressively.”129 Agencies with the power to define their own jurisdiction would have
substantially more power and fewer restraints than if their jurisdiction was defined by the courts.
As a separation-of-powers issue, this places even more power in the hands of the executive and
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implies that Congress explicit or implicitly intends to delegate jurisdictional powers. Chief
Justice Roberts, in his dissent, raises separation-of-powers concerns over allowing agencies to
determine their own jurisdiction and argues that, under the Constitution, “Our task…to fix the
boundaries of delegated authority…is not a task we can delegate to the agency.”130 A large
portion of Chief Justice Roberts dissent focuses on highlighting separation of powers. The
separation-of-powers issues raised by, and in, Arlington did not go unnoticed on the Court and,
even before the decision, there were growing concerns about Chevron in conservative
intellectual thought.
Conservative criticisms of Chevron’s constitutionality vis-à-vis separation-of-powers
appeared in City of Arlington through an amicus curiae brief submitted by the Cato Institute, a
prominent conservative think tank. This brief warned that judicial deference to an agency’s
interpretation of its own jurisdiction “is inconsistent with… the system of checks and balances
established by the Constitution.”131 By the time of Arlington, conservatives were beginning to
adopt the view that judicial deference was an unacceptable and unconstitutional delegation of
legislative and judicial powers to the executive agencies. The brief specifically highlights the
nondelegation doctrine issues of Chevron as well as the control of judicial deference to agencies
that Congress should ultimately possess. These arguments, made by members of the conservative
intellectual movement, represent a broad shift in attitudes towards deference. Rather than
thinking of judicial deference merely in terms of its regulatory or deregulatory effects, there was
a growing and substantial concern surrounding whether judicial deference to agencies was even
constitutional, regardless of its desirability as a policy.
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Interestingly, despite the expansions to Chevron’s domain in the preceding cases, the
Court implied two years later in King v. Burwell (2015)132 that there may be serious limits on
how far the concept of “implicit” delegation can be taken. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice
Roberts argued that agencies may not be eligible for Chevron deference on “a question of deep
‘economic and political significance’; had Congress wished to assign that question to an agency,
it surely would have done so expressly.”133 This decision, like Mead, aligns Chevron deference
and judicial deference in general closer to an issue of delegation, rather than one of judicial selfrestraint. Unlike Mead, Burwell takes this delegation justification for deference on step further,
arguing that there are some issues that are so significant that Congress could not have possibly
meant to leave them up to the agency. Indeed, clear and outright concerns about the
constitutionality of Chevron under the doctrine of separation-of-powers have begun to appear on
the Court itself.
The constitutionality concerns raised by Justice Thomas in Michigan v. EPA (2015)134
illustrate clearly that the problematic relationship between Chevron and separation-of-powers,
which has grown as the Court has expanded some areas of the doctrine, have reached even into
the Supreme Court itself. One of the notable elements of the debate over Bumpers was the
significant opposition to the elimination of deference within the judiciary itself, particularly the
courts. In the more recent debates over the constitutionality of the doctrine of judicial deference,
this does not appear to be the case, as members of the judiciary have expressed concern over the
doctrine. In his concurrence with the Michigan v. EPA decision, Justice Thomas writes that
“these cases bring into bold relief the scope of the potentially unconstitutional delegations we
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have come to countenance in the name of Chevron deference.”135 Although he was not joined by
any of the other justices, the appearance of this line of criticism in the Court is notable. Even
though there had been criticism of the constitutionality or desirability of elements of Chevron on
the periphery of the doctrine, Justice Thomas’s dissent went a step beyond previous concerns,
questioning the constitutional underpinnings of Chevron itself. Despite Justice Thomas’s solitude
in his concurrence, it appears that criticism of Chevron in the judiciary may be growing.
Perhaps one of the most significant recent developments in the judiciary’s attitude
towards Chevron and judicial deference in general was the elevation of Neil Gorsuch to the
position of associate justice, taking the place of the late Justice Scalia. Where Justice Scalia had
been the foremost advocate on the Court for Chevron,136 Justice Gorsuch has expressed
considerable concerns about the constitutionality of the Chevron doctrine, particularly relating to
the separation-of-powers aspect of the judicial deference. In an opinion written while he was still
a judge on the Tenth Circuit, Gorsuch excoriated Chevron, saying “the fact is Chevron and
Brand X permit executive bureaucracies to swallow huge amounts of core judicial and legislative
power and concentrate federal power in a way that seems more than a little difficult to square
with the Constitution….”137 This indictment of the Chevron doctrine is probably one of the most
blunt and direct challenges to judicial deference on constitutional grounds. This decision,
especially in light of Justice Gorsuch’s elevation to the Supreme Court bench, highlights the
extent to which Chevron is no longer simply seen as a tool for deregulation. Instead, an
increasingly common refrain among conservatives in the judiciary and the intellectual
community is that Chevron, at its theoretical core, is undesirable.
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The Renewed Political Debate and SOPRA
Perhaps just as important as the growth of these constitutionality concerns in the judiciary
is that the wider political environment has also begun to reflect these critical, constitutional
attitude towards Chevron, particularly in the Republican Party. The 2016 Republican Platform
states, as one of its planks, that “we further affirm that courts should interpret laws as written by
Congress rather than allowing executive agencies to rewrite those laws to suit administration
priorities.”138 Although this plank does not mention judicial deference directly by name, it does
criticize the underlying principles of Chevron deference, particularly the flexibility it gives
agencies in reinterpreting their statutes. It is worth noting that the mere mention of judicial
deference in the 2016 platform is a significant departure from the 1980 platform, when judicial
deference had previously been a topic of debate. Indeed, while the 1980 platform simply stated
that Congress must reduce its delegation of power to agencies, the 2016 platform takes care to
mention both Congress and the judiciary in its calls for reigning in the power of administrative
agencies. Although the party platform is a list of aspirations and promises, rather than a clear todo list, the mention of judicial deference in the platform signals that its elimination has a broad
enough appeal to be a stated goal of the Republican Party. Beyond the platform, there has also
been a renewed debate within Congress about the desirability of judicial deference.
The debate in Congress demonstrates how judicial deference, once an issue that cut
through both parties, has instead become an issue the cut between the two parties. Congress has
recognized the growing turmoil within the judiciary surrounding the Chevron doctrine in
particular and has engaged in lengthy discussions of the doctrine, holding a hearing directly on
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Chevron in 2016.139 This hearing was the first formal discussion of judicial deference since the
hearings on the Administrative Procedures Act of 1981, which focused on the Bumpers
Amendment. Importantly, unlike like the hearings in 1980, which only looked at judicial
deference as part of a wider package of regulatory reform, the 2016 hearing singled out judicial
deference to agencies and focused solely on Chevron.
One reason for this exclusive focus on deference may be that Congress recognized that
the courts themselves were presenting a unified view of judicial deference. The chairman of the
Subcommittee on Regulatory Reform, Tom Marino (PA-R), in his opening statement, explicitly
notes Justice Thomas’s concerns about Chevron’s constitutionality from his concurrence in
Michigan v. EPA.140 Although Justice Thomas’s comments in his concurrence were not joined by
any of the other justices, his apprehension was noticed by members of Congress. The branches of
government do not exist in isolation and, especially in areas where all three branches overlap,
concerns that originate in one branch are noticed by the other branches. This hearing is
particularly interesting in the way that it differs from the previous hearings on the Bumpers
Amendment in terms of the way the discussion surrounding judicial deference is framed and that
the way that those difference seem to be informed by, or at least reflect, the constitutional
anxieties that developed with the expansions and contractions of the Chevron doctrine.
One of the most important differences between the Chevron hearing and the hearings
involving the Bumpers Amendment is the shift in Congress’s focus from whether judicial
deference and its removal could be used as a tool to constrain regulations to whether the doctrine
violates separation-of-powers principles. The Chairman of the Committee on the judiciary, Bob
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Goodlatte (VA-R), argues in his prepared statement that “…judicial deference under Chevron
weakens separation of powers, threatening liberty.”141 Many of the concerns driving the
Congressional inquiry into Chevron centered on its apparent violation of separation-of-powers
principles, which seemed to premise Republican skepticism of the doctrine. These concerns
formed a large portion of Professor Turley’s testimony in the hearing, where he warns that
“Chevron is a deeply problematic subject” from a constitutional point of view.
It is important that Professor Turley raised the constitutional concerns surrounding
Chevron directly before members of Congress. Constitutional judicial deference concerns that
had not been prevalent in the academic community during the 1980s had grown during the
interceding 30 years, particularly in response to cases such as Brand X and City of Arlington. Just
as importantly as the existence of these concerns is that they have been transferred and brought
to the attention of Congress by academics. By testifying before Congress, views that would have
been confined to law journals can be aired openly in public and taken up by the major political
parties, in this case the Republican Party shifting its view of judicial deference from an
administrative issue to a constitutional one.
The most recent attempt to reign in judicial deference to agencies, the Separation of
Powers Restoration Act, illustrates how the political divide caused by judicial deference has
changed. In contrast to the Bumpers Amendment, which split both the Republican and
Democratic parties on the acceptability of judicial deference to agencies, the elimination of
deference through SOPRA instead merely divide Congress along party lines, with the 2016
version passing the House of Representatives 239-171. In Committee on the judiciary report,142
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the majority view focused particularly on the constitutional issues of Chevron, arguing that the
doctrine contains constitutional issues related to check and balances which necessitate the
passage of SOPRA to remedy. Given the 2016 vote for SOPRA, in which all Republican
members of the House voted for passage, it seems that, by reframing deference as a
constitutional issue rather than an administrative one, Republican leaders in Congress have
managed to avoid the divisions that arose during the Bumpers Amendment. Indeed, it appear that
having Chevron as the avatar of judicial deference seems to have limited the scope of the
conversation. Although SOPRA would eliminate all forms of judicial deference to agency
statutory interpretations, most of the report focused on justifying the elimination of strong levels
of deference like Chevron, with only a brief section at the end of the majority report
acknowledging the weaker Skidmore deference.143
Interestingly, the Democratic viewpoint of Chevron remained firmly rooted in an
administrative prospective. Ranking member of the Committee on the judiciary, John Conyers
(MI-D), focused his opening statement on the benefits of regulations allowed by Chevron and the
costs that would be imposed by increasing judicial review of agency actions.144 The minority
report on SOPRA also argues strongly for the administrative view of Chevron, rather than the
constitutional one, devoting a section of the report titled “No Evidence Exists Proving that
Regulations Have a Significant Adverse Impact on Jobs, Wages, or Innovation” to elaborating on
the benefits of regulation.145 This section notably continues for last half of the minority report
without even mentioning Chevron or judicial deference to agencies. While the majority report
focused on Chevron throughout the document, almost to the exclusion of the other elements of
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judicial deference, the minority report instead focuses on the regulatory aspects to the point of
ignoring the nominal subject.
What the debate around SOPRA suggests is that new viewpoints for old, cross cutting
issues can be introduced to Congress as a result of actions by the judiciary and by the larger legal
community. As these viewpoints grow in prominence, as the constitutional concerns surrounding
Chevron did as the doctrine evolved, they sometimes replace older viewpoints that have caused
intra-party divides. In the case of the Republicans, reframing judicial deference as a
constitutional issue and focusing very closely on the deficiencies of Chevron, nearly eliminated
the political divides within the party that arose during the Bumpers debate. The administrative
lens, which had led to a split on the issue of whether to deregulate using the courts or the
executive, was abandoned and the newer constitutional lens, backed more strongly by academic
support, was adopted in its place. Once the division caused by the deregulation issue was
eliminated, Congress appears to have ended its period of deference to the judiciary and begun to
move forward again with a push to eliminate of judicial deference. The salience of the issue,
which had been reduced after Bumpers, increased as the way that members of Congress
perceived judicial deference changed.

69

Chapter 5: Conclusion

Judicial deference and Chevron are a product of complex times and a testament to ways
that the American system of government has changed in response. Although the bureaucracy is
often referred to as the “fourth branch of government,” it is in many ways a product of an
overlap of power between the three formal branches of government. The power possessed by
agencies is not inherent in the administrative state, but a product of compromise between the
branches of government. Judicial deference is one manifestation of this compromise in which the
judiciary has, in principle if not in practice, to limit the amount of discretion it has in substituting
judgement in the many regulatory cases that come before the courts. The trajectory of the
Chevron doctrine and its evolution provide an insightful look into how changes in the way that
controversial issues are fundamentally viewed can help unite otherwise diverse political
coalitions. Chevron highlights the importance of framing issues in politics. Chevron itself is a
product of viewing judicial deference through an administrative and policy lens. The debate over
whether or not judicial deference was acceptable from a practical, administrative standpoint
created a complex issue that split the dominant political regime. Whether or not one sees judicial
deference as good policy depends on the views one hold towards the desirability of regulation,
the desirability of judicial discretion, and what the full of extent of executive power should be.
With so many different variables involved in decision making, it is perhaps not surprising that
this administrative frame ultimately that led to Congress, unable to fully decide on judicial
deference itself, deferring to the judiciary’s own views.
Political coalitions do not always move in lockstep, even within the same political
parties. This observation is part of the key to understanding the Chevron puzzle. The Reagan-era
push for deregulation did not take the same form as deregulation in the Carter-era and supporters
70

of Carter-era deregulation were not always in agreement with supporters of Reagan-era
regulation. There is a certain irony in the fact that one of the potentially most significant pieces
of anti-regulatory legislation was proposed by a very liberal Democrat146 and defeated by the
election of very deregulatory conservative. The politics of exactly how to go about deregulation,
or at least reign in agencies, were fractured during the transition into the Reagan era and the
intellectual community of the time was strongly opposed to the elimination of judicial deference
from an administrative view.
Changing how the issue of Chevron and judicial deference was framed proved important
in creating a cohesive political coalition. This finding is consistent with previous research
indicating that conservatives use “constitution-talk” in order to create a strong, unified front on
specific issues. In fact, the debate surrounding SOPRA mirrors the observation that “liberal
politicians have insisted on employing policy arguments in situations that conservatives have
framed as constitutional, making little or no reference to the Constitution.”147 The Democratic
argument about judicial deference, and regulation more generally, as correct policy does not
engage the Republican concerns that Chevron is wrong constitutionally. In these cases, the
discourse used by one party is incompatible with the language of the other. It is possible that
something can be recognized as good policy but deemed unconstitutional all the same.148 What
may be good policy is not always constitutional and what may be bad policy can be
constitutional.
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The intellectual conversation surrounding Chevron provides a picture into how
conservative have been able to constitutionalize certain issues and why they may not have done
so with the same issues in the past. These ideas are not generated out of thin air and are “the
product of movements and organized interests.”149 The case of judicial deference demonstrates
the role that the larger intellectual field can play in generating the national political discourse.
While these intellectual movements were certainly important in the development of
constitutional law, they also help in form wider constitutional discussions. Judicial deference
prior to Chevron was, in the eyes of legal academics and the judiciary, primarily an issue of
administrative necessity and an exercise in administrative law. The Bumpers Amendment, Levin
contended, would “add appreciably to the workloads of the federal courts.”150 When the
intellectual community was almost unanimous in viewing judicial deference as an administrative
issue, there was little room or basis to constitutionalize it. Instead, the debate focused mostly on
policy issues.
In the years after Chevron, however, the academic community began to consider strong
judicial deference through a constitutional lens and that is what has driven the debate around
judicial deference in recent years. Gordon Silverstein argues that “the Constitution and legal
language, legal forms, legal ideas, and legal arguments are deeply cherished aspects of American
political culture.”151 When this constitutional language exists, the issue is reduced or perhaps
elevated to its core constitutional acceptability. Before constitutional-talk can reach the political
realm, this language must exist first and be develop within the academic community. And if
academic thought can shape how the Court views its mission and itself,152 in areas of overlap
149
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between the branches, it may also affect how the other branches view their own mission or
responsibilities regarding the issue. If law can “limit, direct, shape, and constrain” politics,153 it
may also provide new dimensions to the political discussion and inform the larger debate when
an issue involved the powers of different branches of government.
What remains to be seen is if this new view of Chevron and judicial deference can hold
together the Republican coalition on judicial deference even in the face of a political transition to
a Republican president from a Democratic one. The demise of Bumpers was possible because the
judicial deference was considered a policy issue and, thus, the arrival of a deregulatory executive
in Ronald Reagan suddenly made judicial deference to agencies “good” policy for Republicans.
Policy positions can be shifted with relative ease as the circumstances that created them change.
This is, in fact, what Justice Scalia found so compelling about the Chevron doctrine in the first
place. Chevron made agency policy flexible, so as to adapt to the practical changes that occur in
the real world over time.154 Policies that may have been poor in the past may become better in
time if real world circumstances change. This flexibility is more difficult with constitutional-talk.
Conservative may have backed themselves into a corner on judicial deference by
choosing to adopt constitutional language over policy language. Silverstein notes that “politics is
capable of highly specific decisions that can be reversed with the next election… but [law] may
shape and constrain [a policy] advocate’s options in the future.”155 So it is with constitutionaltalk in the political branches. While our conception of the constitution may change over time and
generations, often leading to “wrongly” decided cases,156 it rarely does so in a short span of time.
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If something is unconstitutional today, it is unlikely that it will become so by tomorrow. Recent
cases157 blocking deregulatory actions by executive agencies suggest that, from a policy level,
judicial deference to agency statutory interpretation is still a useful tool in the deregulatory tool
kit. If judicial deference has again become good policy for conservatives, however, the argument
that it is bad from a constitutional standpoint remains. Just because there is a Republican in
White House does not mean that Chevron raises any fewer concerns regarding separation-ofpowers. The election of a Republican president may result in another period of extended
Congressional deference to the judiciary or, now that the constitutional genie is out of the bottle,
conservatives may continue to press for the end to judicial deference because, tied up in their
own constitutional argument, they have no other choice.
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and capricious.”
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